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INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, China has played pivotal roles in
developing initiatives such as the BRICS Summit,1 the Regional
* Copyright © 2019 Peter K. Yu. Professor of Law, Professor of Communication, and
Director, Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University. Earlier versions
of this Article were presented at the 2018 University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review
Symposium at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, the 26th Annual Intellectual
Property Law and Policy Conference at Fordham University School of Law, the 9th AsiaPacific Innovation Conference at the Delhi School of Economics in India, and the 2019
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in New Orleans. The Author
is grateful to the participants of these events for valuable comments and suggestions and to
Hugh Hansen for the repeated invitations to the Fordham conference.
1 Featuring the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the
annual BRICS summit has been held in New Delhi (India), Durban (South Africa), Fortaleza
(Brazil), Ufa (Russia), Goa (India), Xiamen (China), and Johannesburg (South Africa). See
Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual Property System, 67
AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1116 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship] (noting the
past BRICS summits); see also Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Negotiations, the BRICS
Factor and the Changing North-South Debate, in THE BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE TO GLOBAL
COOPERATION 148 (Rostam J. Neuwirth et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter BRICS-LAWYERS’
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Comprehensive Economic Partnership2 (RCEP), the New
Development Bank,3 and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.4
China has also negotiated a number of bilateral and regional free trade
agreements (FTAs), connecting the country to markets in Asia,
Australasia, Europe, South America, and other parts of the world.5
Many of these agreements include provisions or chapters on
intellectual property protection and enforcement.6

GUIDE] (discussing the “BRICS factor” in international trade and intellectual property
negotiations). For discussions of the BRICS countries, see generally BRICS AND
DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES: INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND POLICIES (José Eduardo
Cassiolato & Virgínia Vitorino eds., 2011); BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE, supra; ANDREW F.
COOPER, THE BRICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2016); AMRITA NARLIKAR,
NEWPOWERS: HOW TO BECOME ONE AND HOW TO MANAGE THEM (2010); JIM O’NEILL, THE
GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRICS AND BEYOND (2011).
2 For the Author’s discussions of the RCEP negotiations, see generally Peter K. Yu,
The RCEP Negotiations and Asian Intellectual Property Norm Setters, in THE FUTURE OF
ASIAN TRADE DEALS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Liu Kung-Chung & Julien Chaisse eds.,
forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Yu, Asian Norm Setters]; Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP, and the
Crossvergence of Asian Intellectual Property Standards, in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: REGULATORY DIVERGENCE
AND CONVERGENCE IN THE AGE OF MEGAREGIONALS 277 (Peng Shin-yi et al. eds., 2018)
[hereinafter Yu, Crossvergence]; Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP and the Future of Copyright
Normsetting in the Asia-Pacific, in MAKING COPYRIGHT WORK FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC?
JUXTAPOSING HARMONISATION WITH FLEXIBILITY 19 (Susan Corbett & Jessica C. Lai eds.,
2018) [hereinafter Yu, Copyright Normsetting]; Peter K. Yu, The RCEP and Trans-Pacific
Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 673 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, RCEP
and Trans-Pacific Norms].
3 “China is . . . a founding member of the New Development Bank (NDB) consisting
of the so-called BRICS countries . . . .The NDB, established in July 2015, is . . . intended
[for] lending money for infrastructure projects to developing countries.” Daniel C. K. Chow,
Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1255, 1273 n.111 (2016); see also id. (discussing the New Development Bank). See
generally Christiane Itabaiana Martins et al., The BRICS Bank: On the Edge of International
Economic Law and the New Challenges of Twenty-first Century, in BRICS-LAWYERS’
GUIDE, supra note 1, at 180 (discussing the BRICS Bank).
4 See Chow, supra note 3, at 1286–96 (discussing how China could use the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank as a tool to further its policy goals).
5 For discussions of China’s free trade agreements, see generally THE CHINAAUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A 21ST-CENTURY MODEL (Colin Picker et al. eds.,
2018); Henry Gao, The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit, in CHALLENGES TO
MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL
AGREEMENTS 53 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008); Marc Lanteigne, Northern Exposure:
Cross-Regionalism and the China–Iceland Preferential Trade Negotiations, 202 CHINA Q.
362 (2010); Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953 (2011)
[hereinafter Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements].
6 See infra text accompanying notes 25–27.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss3/1

2019]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

277

One new initiative that has not received much scholarly and
policy attention from intellectual property commentators7 concerns
the slowly emerging “One Belt, One Road” Initiative,8 which has now
been officially translated as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).9
Launched in fall 2013, this initiative features two distinct routes: the
land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the sea-based 21st-century
Maritime Silk Road. As David Shambaugh described:
[The BRI sought] to build infrastructure and facilitate
commercial “connectivity” from northwestern China
across Eurasia and from southeast China to Africa and
the eastern Mediterranean. Through [this and other]
initiatives, China is meticulously constructing an
alternative and parallel global institutional
architecture to the postwar western order.10
This Article aims to introduce this new initiative to
intellectual property literature. Part I documents the recent changes
7 Some rare exceptions are Lee Jyh-an, The New Silk Road to Global IP Landscape,
in LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 417 (Lutz-Christian Wolff &
Xi Chao eds., 2016) [hereinafter LEGAL DIMENSIONS]; Peter K. Yu, China, the “Belt and
Road” and Intellectual Property Cooperation, 14 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J.
(forthcoming 2019).
8 For book-length treatments of this initiative, see generally BELT AND ROAD: A
CHINESE WORLD ORDER (Bruno Maçães ed., 2019); CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVES
AND ITS NEIGHBORING DIPLOMACY (Zhang Jie ed. & Xu Mengqi trans., 2017) [hereinafter
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVES]; CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD: INITIATIVE,
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS (Bal Kishan Sharma & Nivedita Das Kundu eds., 2016)
[hereinafter CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD]; CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD INITIATIVE (Lim
Tai-Wei ed., 2016); CHINA’S PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ONE
BELT, ONE ROAD INITIATIVE (Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Niv Horesh eds., 2018)
[hereinafter CHINA’S PRESENCE IN MIDDLE EAST]; INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA UNDER THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (Zhao Yun ed., 2018)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE]; MAPPING CHINA’S “ONE BELT ONE ROAD”
INITIATIVE (Li Xing ed., 2019) [hereinafter MAPPING CHINA’S OBOR INITIATIVE]; TOM
MILLER, CHINA’S ASIAN DREAM (2017); RETHINKING THE SILK ROAD: CHINA’S BELT AND
ROAD INITIATIVE AND EMERGING EURASIAN RELATIONS (Maximilian Mayer ed., 2018)
[hereinafter RETHINKING SILK ROAD]; WANG YIWEI, THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: WHAT
WILL CHINA OFFER THE WORLD IN ITS RISE (2016).
9 See NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N ET AL., VISION AND ACTIONS ON JOINTLY
BUILDING SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT AND 21ST-CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD (2015)
[hereinafter VISION AND ACTIONS] (providing the official translation of a guiding document
issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce, with the State Council’s authorization).
10 DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S FUTURE 162–63 (2016).
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to China’s approach toward international intellectual property norm
setting. This Part highlights three notable developments that have
greatly enhanced the country’s ability to shape future norms in this
area: the negotiation of bilateral and regional FTAs, the establishment
of the RCEP, and the launch of the BRI. Part II recognizes the key
analytical challenges concerning the BRI and outlines five sets of
inquiries that could help enhance our understanding of the initiative.
This Part points out that the initiative’s lack of development in the
intellectual property area has presented a rare opportunity to shape its
future. In view of this opportunity, Part III examines six distinct areas
of potential cooperation: substantive standards, procedural
arrangements, cross-border enforcement, dispute resolution,
technical cooperation, and market aggregation. Focusing on each
area in turn, this Part highlights some of the BRI’s potential
constructive possibilities.
This Article concludes by briefly
identifying three distinct camps that subscribe to very different views
on the initiative’s prospects and perils.
I.

China’s Changing International Approach11

In the past two decades, China’s international profile has been
changing rapidly. Although the country has become more active
following its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO),12 its
involvement has remained tentative until recently. This tentative
position can be attributed to a confluence of factors, including the
Chinese leaders’ priority focus on domestic matters, the country’s
need to cultivate goodwill from its neighbors, the complications
created by the changing Chinese political leadership, the WTO-plus
concessions China had made when it joined the international trading
body, and the highly uneven developments within the country.13

11

This Part draws on research from Peter K. Yu, The Rise of China in the International
Intellectual Property Regime, in HANDBOOK ON THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF CHINA 424 (Zeng Ka ed., 2019) [hereinafter Yu, Rise of China].
12 China became the 143rd member of the WTO in December 2001. See Press Release,
World Trade Org., WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession (Nov. 11,
2001), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm [https://perma.cc/884LA7HY] (announcing China’s admission to the WTO).
13 See Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR.
REV. INT’L L. 209, 229–37 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Middle Kingdom] (discussing these
factors).
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To some extent, China’s international approach in the first
decade and a half following the WTO accession has been guided by
Deng Xiaoping’s plea for self-restraint. As he reportedly said after
the 1989 Tiananmen incident: “[W]atch and analyze developments
calmly; secure our own positions; deal with change with confidence;
conceal our capacities; be good at keeping a low profile; never
become the leader.”14 To a large extent, the emphasis on “taoguang
yanghui”—or what commentators have sometimes translated
incompletely as “hide our strength and bide our time”15—explains the
development of such notions as “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) and
“peace and development”16 and the focus on constructing a
harmonious, multipolar world.17
Nevertheless, recent years have seen China slowly moving
toward greater engagement at both the regional and global levels.
Some commentators even suggested that the current Chinese
leadership has now moved away from, if not abandoned, the approach
of “taoguang yanghui.”18 To highlight China’s changing approach
toward international engagement, this Part focuses on three notable
developments that have enabled China to shape future international
intellectual property norms.
14 See Teng Chung-chian, Hegemony or Partnership: China’s Strategy and Diplomacy
Toward Latin America, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: BEIJING’S STRATEGY FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 84, 88 (Joshua Eisenman et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter CHINA
AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD] (“[W]atch and analyze developments calmly [lengjing
guancha]; secure our own positions [chenzhuo yingfu]; deal with change with confidence
[wenzhu zhenjiao]; conceal our capacities [taoguang yanghui]; be good at keeping a low
profile [shanyu shouzhuo]; never become the leader [juebu dantou].”).
15 The phrase taoguang yanghui “is usually translated as ‘hide our strength and bide
our time’, but literally means ‘hide light, nurture obscurity’.” MILLER, supra note 8, at 26;
see also Verna Yu, “China Threat” Hangs on a Phrase, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 2,
2010, at 4 (discussing the controversy surrounding the oft-misinterpreted phrase “taoguang
yanghui” in the context of China’s foreign policy).
16 Kurt M. Campbell, Foreword to CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 14,
at ix, x.
17 See C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD
NEEDS TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 129 (2006) (discussing the notion
of a “multipolar world” that China has promoted); HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 500 (2011)
(discussing the notion of a “harmonious world” that China has promoted).
18 See Maximilian Mayer, China’s Rise as Eurasian Power: The Revival of the Silk
Road and Its Consequences, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 1, 2 (“[A] new
generation of leaders under President Xi Jinping has gradually abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s
principle of ‘biding time while lying low.’”); Yu, Rise of China, supra note 11, at 436
(“China has now been slowly moving away from Deng Xiaoping’s guidance that China
should ‘conceal [its] capacities’ (taoguang yanghui) and ‘be good at keeping a low profile’
(shanyu shouzhuo).”).
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The first development concerns the establishment of bilateral
and regional trade agreements, which China has actively developed
since the early 2000s.19 At the time of writing, China has established
bilateral agreements with Chile, Pakistan, New Zealand, Singapore,
Peru, Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, South Korea, Australia,
Georgia, and the Maldives.20 With the ten members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China also
established the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area.21
Taken together, these agreements have shown not only
China’s growing emphasis on intellectual property issues, but also its
ability to play a more sophisticated FTA game.22 For illustrative
purposes, the China–Singapore Free Trade Agreement does not have
a single intellectual property provision,23 and the China–Pakistan
Free Trade Agreement mentions the term “intellectual property” only
twice—in relation to border measures and investment but not
substantive protection.24 By contrast, the China–New Zealand Free
Trade Agreement contains an intellectual property chapter of close to
800 words.25 The size of that chapter quickly doubled to more than

19

See sources cited supra note 5.
Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 1, at 1112.
21 See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 5, at 1007–09 (discussing the
establishment of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area); see also Peter K. Yu, The
Incremental Development of the ASEAN–China Strategic Intellectual Property Partnership,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Christoph Antons & Michael
Blakeney eds., forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Yu, ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership]
(discussing the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area in the intellectual property context). The ten
members of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEAN Member Countries,
ASS’N SE. ASIAN NATIONS,
http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/ [https://perma.cc/Z9ZP-U369] (last visited
Oct. 13, 2016).
22 See Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements and China’s Global Intellectual Property
Strategy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION 247, 265 (Christoph Antons & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2015) (noting the growing
emphasis on intellectual property issues in China’s bilateral and regional FTAs).
23 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China
and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, China-Sing., Oct. 23, 2008.
24 See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 10, China-Pak., Nov. 24,
2006 (laying down special requirements related to border measures); id. art. 46.1(d)
(providing the coverage of the term “investment”).
25 See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
China and the Government of New Zealand ch. 12, China-N.Z., Apr. 7, 2008 (providing the
intellectual property chapter).
20
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1500 words in the China–Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement26 and
again doubled to more than 3000 words in the China–Switzerland
Free Trade Agreement.27 The latter agreement was the first Chinese
FTA to include a detailed intellectual property chapter with a wide
variety of provisions.28
The second development concerns the ongoing negotiation of
the RCEP. Launched in November 2012, this partnership built on
past trade and non-trade discussions between the ten ASEAN
members and their six major Asia-Pacific neighbors (Australia,
China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea).29 Together,
these sixteen countries “account for almost half of the world’s
population, over 30 per cent of global [gross domestic product] and
over a quarter of world exports.”30 Upon establishment, the RCEP
will cover not only China and India, but also two high-income Asian
economies (Japan and South Korea). The pact will also feature six
other countries that were involved in the negotiation of the TransPacific Partnership31 (TPP)—namely, Australia, Brunei Darussalam,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. Together with
Japan, these six countries have now become members of the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific

26 See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
China and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica ch. 10, China-Costa Rica, Apr. 8,
2010 (providing the intellectual property chapter).
27 See Free Trade Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Swiss
Confederation ch. 11, Switz.-China, July 6, 2013, (providing the intellectual property
chapter).
28 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 729–30 (discussing the
expansive intellectual property chapter in the China–Switzerland Free Trade Agreement).
29 Id. at 675.
30 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE
(Austl.), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-economicpartnership.aspx [https://perma.cc/7ZQX-TTMT] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (Austl.).
31 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016,
https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-fulltext [https://perma.cc/K8A3-CMW6]. For the Author’s discussions of the TPP, see generally
Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE:
21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE
258 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2014) [hereinafter Yu, ACTA/TPP Country Clubs]; Yu,
Crossvergence, supra note 2; Yu, Copyright Normsetting, supra note 2; Peter K. Yu,
Thinking About the Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a Mega-Regional Agreement on Life
Support), 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 97 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, Thinking About the TPP];
Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1129 (2014).
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Partnership32 (CPTPP). Developed to replace the TPP Agreement
following the United States’ withdrawal,33 the CPTPP was signed in
Chile in March 2018 and has recently entered into force.34
Although the RCEP negotiations were established not solely
as a reactive response or a defensive measure to the TPP
negotiations,35 the exclusion of China and other emerging countries
in Asia from the TPP most certainly has accelerated the RCEP
negotiations.36 From China’s standpoint, the preference for a
32 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Mar. 8,
2018,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreementsconcluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-transpacific-partnership-text [https://perma.cc/ZR93-E9DA]; see also Yu, Thinking About the
TPP, supra note 32, at 104–06 (discussing the CPTPP); CPTPP vs TPP, N.Z. MINISTRY
FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-undernegotiation/cptpp-2/tpp-and-cptpp-the-differences-explained/
[https://perma.cc/BP5A-PQ8X] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (explaining the differences
between the TPP and the CPTPP).
33 See Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017);
see also Yu, Thinking About the TPP, supra note 32, at 101–10 (discussing the United States’
withdrawal and its aftermath).
34 See Ankit Panda, The CPTPP Trade Agreement Will Enter into Force, DIPLOMAT
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/the-cptpp-trade-agreement-will-enter-intoforce-on-december-30/ [https://perma.cc/J4FJ-83GE] (reporting Australia’s ratification of
the CPTPP).
35 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 678 (“Although the RCEP
negotiations were launched in November 2012—more than two years after the beginning of
the TPP negotiations—they were not established solely as a reactive response to the latter.”).
36 As I noted in an earlier article:
Although the ASEAN+6 leaders’ joint declaration did not specifically
mention the TPP, there is no denying that the development of this United
States–led partnership has greatly accelerated the RCEP negotiations.
The latter negotiations were particularly urgent when two major
ASEAN+6 economies, China and India, were intentionally excluded
from the TPP. Also excluded were other key ASEAN+6 members, such
as Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.
Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 681–83; see also Du Ming, Explaining
China’s Tripartite Strategy Toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 18 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 407, 424 (2015) (“After the USA introduced the TPP and several ASEAN members
joined the TPP negotiations, ASEAN has been concerned that the USA might take away its
leadership of Asian economic integration and marginalize the Association. ASEAN’s
proposal for forming the RCEP in 2012 was at least partially motivated by this concern.”);
Shintaro Hamanaka, Trans-Pacific Partnership Versus Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting 13 (Asian Development Bank,
Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146, 2014),
https://aric.adb.org/pdf/workingpaper/WP146_Hamanaka_Trans-Pacific_Partnership.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6L99-YY24] (stating that, while China’s dominant strategy “is to establish
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regional pact in which the country can play some leadership role is
easy to understand. As Shintaro Hamanaka explained:
[T]he formation of regional integration and
cooperation frameworks can be best understood as a
dominant state’s attempt to create its own regional
framework where it can exercise some exclusive
influence. . . . For an economy that wants to increase
its influence, establishing a regional group where it
can be the most powerful state—dominating other
members in terms of material capacity—is
convenient. . . . By assuming [such] leadership, an
economy can set a favorable agenda and establish
convenient rules. In addition, the most powerful state
can increase influence through prestige and
asymmetric economic interdependence with others.37
Thus far, ASEAN+6 members have already entered into
twenty-five rounds of negotiations.38 Once the RCEP negotiations
conclude, it is anticipated that the final text will cover a wide range
of areas, including “trade in goods, trade in services, investment,
economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property,
competition [and] dispute settlement.”39 Beyond these areas,
working or sub-working groups have also been established to address
rules of origin; customs procedures and trade facilitation; legal and
institutional issues; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; standards,
a regional framework that does not include the United States so it can hold a dominant
position,” Japan seems to have been “using the ‘PRC card’ to improve its TPP negotiation
position vis-à-vis the United States”); Michael Wesley, Who Calls the Tune? Asia Has to
Dance to Duelling Trade Agendas, CONVERSATION (Oct. 19, 2014),
https://theconversation.com/whocalls-the-tune-asia-has-to-dance-to-duelling-tradeagendas-32813 [https://perma.cc/8MDH-K6KM] (“For Beijing, RCEP is a defensive
measure against the TPP. It is calculating that the lure of the size and dynamism of the
Chinese economy will convince the region to opt for a more ‘Asianist’ grouping, rather than
the TPP’s Pacific model, which threatens to divide Asia’s economic regionalism.”).
37 Hamanaka, supra note 36, at 2 (footnote and citations omitted).
38 See Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: News, DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. &
TRADE, http://dfat.gov.aultrade/agreements/rcep/news/Pages/news.aspx
[https://perma.cc/T3XE-8LZM] (last visited July 6, 2016) (Austl.) [hereinafter RCEP News].
39 ASEAN Plus Six, Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership pmbl. (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/Documents/guiding-principles-rcep.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2AC7-EU6W] [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
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technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures;
electronic commerce; financial services; and telecommunications.40
Given this large number of working and sub-working groups,
it remains to be seen whether their establishment will result in the
creation of standalone chapters in each specific area. The Guiding
Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Guiding Principles) did
mention specifically “the text on intellectual property in the RCEP.”41
Knowledge Ecology International, a nongovernmental organization
active in the intellectual property area, also leaked an early draft of
the RCEP intellectual property chapter.42 Although that draft was
dated October 15, 2015 and has most certainly evolved following the
United States’ withdrawal from the TPP and the CPTPP’s eventual
suspension of select TPP provisions,43 it will be very unlikely for the
RCEP negotiating parties to abandon their plan to include an
intellectual property chapter in their agreement.44
The last development is the most interesting yet also the most
uncertain.45 It concerns the slowly emerging BRI, which is the focus
of this Article. Inspired by the Silk Road that dates back to two

40 See RCEP News, supra note 38 (reporting the formation of working and sub-working
groups).
41 See Guiding Principles, supra note 39, pt. V (“The text on intellectual property in the
RCEP will aim to reduce [intellectual property]–related barriers to trade and investment by
promoting economic integration and cooperation in the utilization, protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”).
42 See 2015 Oct 15 Version: RCEP IP Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Apr. 19,
2016), http://keionline.org/node/2472 [https://perma.cc/4VJQ-T5NL] (providing the leaked
October 15, 2015 text of the proposed RCEP intellectual property chapter).
43 Although the CPTPP kept intact a large part of the original TPP intellectual property
chapter, it suspended the more controversial intellectual property provisions, such as those
covering copyright and patent terms, undisclosed test or other data, biologics, technological
protection measures, and legal remedies and safe harbours. See Yu, Thinking About the TPP,
supra note 32, at 105 (discussing the CPTPP’s suspension of select TPP provisions).
44 See Peter K. Yu, The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 673, 722 (2017) (“Absent any catastrophic developments in the
RCEP negotiations, the investment in [the working group on intellectual property] is just too
substantial for the [intellectual property] chapter to be abandoned at this late stage.”).
45 See Lutz-Christian Wolff & Xi Chao, Preface to LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7,
at xvii, xvii (“Despite the fact that its tremendous significance for local, regional and global
developments is widely acknowledged the precise scope, aims and even the participating
countries of the intuitive are not yet clearly defined.”); see also Mayer, supra note 18, at 28
(“[T]he question how the [BRI] can be developed into a multilateral institution raises puzzles
that put the Chinese elites’ creativity and tenacity to a hard test.”).
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millennia ago46 and aiming to rejuvenate the nation,47 Chinese
President Xi Jinping announced the construction of the land-based
Silk Road Economic Belt at Nazarbayev University in Astana,
Kazakhstan in September 2013.48 This announcement was followed
a month later by President Xi’s introduction of the sea-based 21stcentury Maritime Silk Road during a speech made at the Indonesian
Parliament.49 Together, the two new “Silk Roads” have now become
the BRI, which many commentators have considered President Xi’s
“centrepiece of [his] ‘proactive’ foreign policy.”50 As the Chinese
government declared in its guiding document entitled Vision and
Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road (Vision and Actions):
Accelerating the building of the Belt and Road can
help promote the economic prosperity of the countries
along the Belt and Road and regional economic
cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual
learning between different civilizations, and promote
world peace and development.
It is a great
undertaking that will benefit people around the
world.51

46 “The ancient Silk Road started from Chang’an (now referred to as Xi’an), an ancient
Chinese capital, which went through countries in Central Asia like Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq,
Syria to reach the Mediterranean, and ends in Rome. The road ran 6,440 km.” Zhang
Yunling, Belt and Road Initiative as a Grand Strategy, in CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD
INITIATIVES, supra note 8, at 3, 6.
47 See MILLER, supra note 8, at 33 (“There is little doubt that President Xi sees the Belt
and Road as a practical step towards realizing the strategic goal of national
rejuvenation . . . .”). As Tom Miller observed further:
President Xi’s mission . . . to return China to what he regards as its
natural, rightful and historical position as the greatest power in Asia . . .
does not mean that China has to replace the US as the world’s only
superpower, but it does mean that Asia has to predominate in its own
backyard.
Id. at 11.
48 WANG, supra note 8, at 22.
49 Id.
50 MILLER, supra note 8, at 30; see also id. at 12 (“[The BRI] is Xi Jinping’s signature
policy, designed to secure his legacy.”); Mayer, supra note 18, at 2 (describing the BRI as
“the most ambitious foreign policy approach adopted by China thus far”).
51 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, preface.
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Although a growing volume of literature has now slowly
emerged to examine this new initiative,52 especially within China,53
it remains unclear how the initiative will affect the country and the
world at large in the intellectual property area. Indeed, there has not
been much discussion of the BRI in this area.54 This lack of
discussion is understandable, considering that the initiative has
focused primarily on connectivity55 and infrastructural
development.56
52

See sources cited supra note 8.
As Maximilian Mayer observed:
Within China . . . , the study of the [BRI] has developed into a cottage
industry as the Chinese government initiated a broad academic debate
and called for input from various domestic research institutes, think
tanks, and universities in order to articulate a comprehensive policy
based on Xi’s earlier remarks. Over one hundred institutes have formed
a special [BRI] think tank alliance. The massive increase in official
funding began to impact the entire research landscape of Chinese
academia.
Mayer, supra note 18, at 3 (footnote omitted). Professor Wang contrasted the different
receptions of the BRI within and outside China:
Two years after its launch, B&R [Belt and Road] is beset with symptoms
of being “hot inside and cold outside”. Within the context of China, the
inland provinces located along the B&R consider the B&R a massive
opportunity for economic development. However, reactions are mixed
in relation to the countries along the B&R.
Wang, supra note 8, at 96. But see Mayer, supra note 18, at 9 (“The [BRI] is, arguably, the
first Chinese concept that has a lasting impact on international discourses.”).
54 See generally Lee, supra note 7 (discussing the BRI in the intellectual property
context).
55 See Nivedita Das Kundu, Introduction to CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD, supra note
8, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Kundu, Introduction] (stating that the BRI “can . . . be considered as a
transnational connectivity model, as it aims to coordinate factors of economic circulation
across different national spaces, with different governance models, legal norms and political
contingencies”); Zhang, supra note 46, at 7 (“Connectivity are pillars of the Belt and Road
strategy.”).
56 As the Chinese government declared in Vision and Actions:
Facilities connectivity is a priority area for implementing the Initiative.
On the basis of respecting each other’s sovereignty and security
concerns, countries along the Belt and Road should improve the
connectivity of their infrastructure construction plans and technical
standard systems, jointly push forward the construction of international
trunk passageways, and form an infrastructure network connecting all
sub-regions in Asia, and between Asia, Europe and Africa step by step.
At the same time, efforts should be made to promote green and lowcarbon infrastructure construction and operation management, taking
into full account the impact of climate change on the construction.
VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. IV; see also Alexander Demissie, Special Economic
Zones: Integrating African Countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in RETHINKING
53
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Nevertheless, the past few years have seen growing
developments in the intellectual property area. In July 2016, the
Chinese government co-organized with the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) a two-day High Level Conference on
Intellectual Property for Countries Along the “Belt and Road” in
Beijing.57 At that conference, State Councilor Wang Yong called on
countries to “work together to prioritize IP [intellectual property] as
a system to promote innovation and to share the benefits of
innovation.”58 He further noted that the BRI could provide assistance
in four areas: “cooperation in IP-related services, harmonization of IP
rules, inter-operability of databases, and joint human resources
training.”59
In May 2017, China adopted the Agreement on Enhancing
“Belt and Road” Intellectual Property Cooperation with WIPO.60
The country also “signed memorandums of understanding on IP
cooperation with a large number of countries including Tajikistan,
Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and
Egypt.”61 In addition, China “carried out extensive cooperation with
[Belt and Road] countries in terms of IP education, publicity, training
and information exchange.”62 In August 2018, a second High Level
Conference on Intellectual Property for Countries Along the “Belt

SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 69, 73–76 (discussing infrastructural development as a catalyst
for industrialization and development); Li Xing, China’s Pursuit of the “One Belt One
Road” Initiative: A New World Order with Chinese Characteristics?, in MAPPING CHINA’S
OBOR INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 1, 14 [hereinafter Li, China’s Pursuit] (“Infrastructure
construction has become the ‘Chinese solution’ in promoting regional economic
integration.”).
57 Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org., High Level “Belt and Road”
Conference Urges Closer IP Collaboration for Economic Growth (July 27, 2016),
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/offices/china/news/2016/news_0008.html
[https://perma.cc/VS2C-Q9R7] [hereinafter Belt and Road Conference Release].
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Press Release, WIPO Director General Visits Belt and Road Forum and China
Supreme People’s Court (May 18, 2017),
https://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/offices/china/news/2017/news_0001.html
[https://perma.cc/LB9R-EC6R].
61 Li You, Intellectual Property in Focus at High-Level Forum in Beijing, CHINA DAILY
(Aug. 29, 2018), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2018-08/29/content_36837702.htm
[https://perma.cc/WUR5-N7RD] [hereinafter Li, Intellectual Property in Focus].
62 Id.
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and Road” was held in Beijing.63 The event emphasized the BRI’s
importance in the intellectual property area while exploring its many
promises and challenges.64
When the developments surrounding China’s FTAs, the
RCEP, and the BRI are taken together, they show the country’s
increasing eagerness to assert itself in the international arena,
including in matters involving intellectual property protection and
enforcement. It will be too early to evaluate the full impact of this
new approach toward international engagement, but the changing
approach has certainly raised a number of interesting questions: Will
this approach result in greater convergence or divergence of
international and regional intellectual property norms?65 Will the
approach intensify the ongoing rivalry between intellectual property
norm setters in Asia?66 What impact will this approach has on the
international intellectual property regime and the global
community?67
II.

Belt and Road Initiative

Shortly after the BRI’s announcement, policymakers and
commentators began to wonder about the initiative’s motives, logic,
63

Press Release, Nat’l Intellectual Prop. Admin. of China, The 2018 High-Level
Conference on IP for Countries Along Belt and Road Highlights Inclusiveness,
Development, Cooperation, Mutual Benefit (Aug. 29, 2018),
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/specialtopic/tbar2018/tbar2018headlines/1131331.htm
[https://perma.cc/N5MA-6NRS].
64 Press Release, Nat’l Intellectual Prop. Admin. of China, 2018 High-level Conference
on Intellectual Property for Countries Along the Belt and Road Approaching (Aug. 27,
2018),
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/specialtopic/tbar2018/tbar2018prb/1131291.htm
[https://perma.cc/KH7J-FBYZ] (stating that the conference “aim[ed] to exchange views on
the new situation of international IP development at present, discuss IP problems confronting
countries along the Belt and Road, and explore the vision of cooperation in the future”).
65 See generally Yu, Crossvergence, supra note 2, at 278 (arguing that the RCEP
negotiations will result in neither convergence nor divergence, but “crossvergence,” of
regional intellectual property norms).
66 See generally Yu, Asian Norm Setters, supra note 2 (discussing the rivalry between
Asian intellectual property norm setters); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Battle
to Define Asia’s Intellectual Property Law: From TPP to RCEP, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 331
(2018) (discussing the struggle between key RCEP negotiating parties over intellectual
property rules).
67 See generally Yu, Copyright Normsetting, supra note 2, at 42–45 (discussing the
battle between the TPP, the CPTPP, and the RCEP); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note
5, at 1018–27 (discussing “the battle of the FTAs”).
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ramifications, and geographical reach.68 Some even compared the
BRI to the Chinese “Marshall Plan,” bringing to mind the United
States–led reconstruction effort in Europe following the end of the
Second World War.69 It was not until the Chinese government’s
release of Vision and Actions that analysis of the BRI began to
concretize.70 Even now, commentators remain deeply divided over
the initiative’s overall benefits, potential drawbacks, and future
impacts.
This Part does not aim to unravel the motive or logic behind
the BRI. Nor does it seek to predict what this initiative will
eventually become. In fact, this Article is comfortable with the
possibility that we may never be able to pinpoint the initiative’s
trajectory.71 After all, the BRI remains a moving target, taking on
68

“The 65 countries along the Belt and Road account for 63 percent of the total
population of the world, but their output only makes up 29 percent of the world’s total.”
WANG, supra note 8, at 4; see Lutz-Christian Wolff, China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative—
An Introduction, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 1, 7 [hereinafter Wolff,
Introduction] (“It now seems to be commonly accepted that in addition to China there are
altogether 64 B&R countries.”); see also id. at 8–19 (providing information about the BRI
countries); WANG, supra note 8, at 76–77 (providing a classification of the 64 countries
involved in the BRI).
69 See Li, China’s Pursuit, supra note 56, at 13 (discussing how the BRI has been
“driven by a number of political, economic and security-related logics similar to those upon
which the Marshall Plan was initiated”); WANG, supra note 8, at 39–44 (explaining how the
BRI, “while not being a Chinese Marshall Plan, has gone beyond the level of the Marshall
Plan”); Yang Minghong, Understanding the One Belt One Road Initiative: China’s
Perspective, in CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD, supra note 8, at 7, 10–13 (discussing whether
the BRI is the Chinese version of the Marshall Plan); see also David J. Lynch, World Bank
Touts Global Stimulus Plan, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 2009, at 4B (reporting Justin Lin’s call
for the establishment of a “global recovery fund in the spirit of the Marshall Plan” when he
was the World Bank’s chief economist). But see Tim Summers, Rocking the Boat? China’s
“Belt and Road” and Global Order, in CHINA’S PRESENCE IN MIDDLE EAST, supra note 8, at
24, 33 (“[N]umerous Chinese scholars have sought to rebut analysis that compares the belt
and road initiative with the post-war Marshall Plan for Europe as [a] way of cementing
China’s geopolitical influence.” (footnote omitted)); see also Mayer, supra note 18, at 7
(noting that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi “dismiss[ed] a comparison between the
[BRI] and the U.S. Marshall Plan”).
70 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9.
71 Commentators have identified multiple reasons behind the BRI’s potential success.
Professor Mayer provided four reasons:
First, the proposal was advanced by president Xi, the strongest leader of
the Chinese Communist Party . . . since Deng Xiaoping. Xi has
sufficient political capital and bureaucratic strength to substantially
carry out the initiative that also became enshrined in the 13th Five-Year
Plan. Second, the uptake in many other countries is much stronger than
anticipated. China’s economic vision to improve Eurasian connectivity
resonates with many, especially against the background of anti-
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new values, meanings, and contents as policymakers develop new
ways to implement this initiative. To some extent, the BRI’s lack of
concrete policy formulation has been a blessing in disguise. For an
area such as intellectual property, having a mostly blank canvas can
be highly appealing.
To enhance our understanding of the BRI, this Part focuses on
five distinct areas of inquiry: (1) the nature of this initiative; (2) its
core objectives; (3) its potential disruption to existing multilateral and
regional institutions; (4) its overall inclusiveness; and (5) the various
responses it will elicit. Greater inquiry in these five areas will shed
light on not only the BRI’s ongoing status, but also its future
evolution.
The first inquiry concerns the nature of the BRI. Initially,
commentators debated whether this initiative is a vision,72 a catchy
slogan,73 an experiment,74 or a “grand strategy.”75 By now, it is quite
globalization agenda of the Trump administration. . . .Third, a failure of
this ambitious project would severely weaken China’s soft power and
jeopardize its global leadership claim. The Chinese leaders, thus, have a
powerful incentive to keep the [BRI] working at almost any cost.
Finally, and most importantly, the government has articulated a
convincing domestic rational[e] for the [BRI] . . . which keeps in check
internal critical voices that question the risky use of taxpayer money
abroad.
Mayer, supra note 18, at 8–9 (footnotes omitted).
72 See Niv Horesh, Introduction: China’s One Belt, One Road Vision—Implications for
the Middle East, in CHINA’S PRESENCE IN MIDDLE EAST, supra note 8, at 1, 1 (referring to
the “One Belt, One Road vision”); Wolff, Introduction, supra note 68, at 4 (“B&R has . . .
been referred to as ‘a vision’ and ‘little more than a buzz word’.”).
73 See Horesh, supra note 72, at 1 (“Others have concluded that B&R is ‘far more than
a slogan’, but still ‘a small phrase with big ambitions.’” (footnote omitted)); Mayer, supra
note 18, at 8 (“[O]bservers call into question the strategic maturity of the Belt and Road
because it could be seen as yet another in a series of political slogans (zhengzhi kouhao) over
the last two decades.”).
74 See Mayer, supra note 18, at 11 (“[The BRI] can be seen as an ‘experimental’
approach that tests how to connect domestic with international economic processes to
guarantee China’s continued growth.” (footnote omitted)).
75 See id. at 2 (“[T]he idea of engineering a revival of the ancient Silk Road marks a
turning point in the debates about China’s strategy.”); WANG, supra note 8, at 20 (“[T]he
Belt and Road Initiative is not just a path option to realize the Chinese Dream, but also a
strategic plan to enhance a rising power’s voice . . . .”); Zhang, supra note 46, at 6–8
(discussing the BRI as a “grand strategy”). But see Kundu, Introduction, supra note 55, at 2
(“The thinking behind the ‘Belt’ and ‘Road’ strategy as defined by Chinese government is
an ‘initiative’ and not as a ‘plan’ or ‘strategy’.”); MILLER, supra note 8, at 30 (“Beijing is
adamant that [the BRI] should not be called a ‘plan’ or a ‘strategy’, lest it be interpreted as
a ruse to build a vast economic empire.”); Yang, supra note 69, at 7 (“The use of the word
‘strategy’ suggests that China wants to pursue the benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative
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clear that the BRI is an initiative, as its name suggests. As the
Chinese government stated in Vision and Actions, this initiative is “a
systematic project” seeking to “integrate the development strategies
of the countries along the Belt and Road.”76 To complicate matters,
the initiative, like the Silk Road that provided its inspiration, will
likely evolve over a long period of time.77 As Wang Yiwei, the author
of a highly comprehensive monograph on the BRI, recounted the
gradual and sprawling development of the ancient maritime Silk
Road:
The history of the ancient maritime Silk Road can . . .
be dated back to more than 2,000 years, when people
in the Han Dynasty opened the maritime route to India
through Southeast Asia. The Tang Dynasty (618–
907) turned the focus of foreign trade from the land
route to the sea route. The Song Dynasty (960–1279)
and Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) encouraged Arabian
businessmen to trade in cities such as Guangzhou and
Quanzhou, so that coverage has been expanded to the
Persian Gulf and the coastal areas of Arabia through
the Indian Ocean, rather than just to South India
through Southeast Asia. The Ming Dynasty (1368–
1644) opened a route for trade using sailing vessels
starting from Manila to Mexico’s Acapulco, through
which Chinese silk and silk products carried to Manila
by Chinese commercial ships were shipped across the
Pacific Ocean to the American Continent, and then to
European countries across the Atlantic Ocean.78

exclusively from the perspective of its own national interests and it is even a game strategy
targeting certain countries.”).
76 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, preface; see also Kundu, Introduction, supra note
55, at 1, 2 (“The debate on the [BRI] by China focuses on and anticipates possible policy
convergence between China and other Sovereign national governments along the road.”).
77 See Yang, supra note 69, at 13 (noting the view of a senior adviser to the United
States Energy Security Council that “the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative is not a temporary plan,
but will involve one and more generations and can even go beyond the century”).
78 WANG, supra note 8, at 31; see also Anastas Vangeli, A Framework for the Study of
the One Belt One Road Initiative as a Medium of Principle Diffusion, in MAPPING CHINA’S
OBOR INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 57, 61 (“The [BRI] is a concept ‘with Chinese
characteristics’, meaning that it is being developed incrementally, and with a long-term
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The second inquiry pertains to the BRI’s core objectives. The
Chinese government’s guiding document explicitly identified a
number of priority objectives:
The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the
connectivity of Asian, European and African
continents and their adjacent seas, establish and
strengthen partnerships among the countries along the
Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional, multi-tiered
and composite connectivity networks, and realize
diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable
development in these countries. The connectivity
projects of the Initiative will help align and coordinate
the development strategies of the countries along the
Belt and Road, tap market potential in this region,
promote investment and consumption, create demands
and job opportunities, enhance people-to-people and
cultural exchanges, and mutual learning among the
peoples of the relevant countries, and enable them to
understand, trust and respect each other and live in
harmony, peace and prosperity.79
The document further called on countries along the Belt and
Road to “promote policy coordination, facilities connectivity,
unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds as
their five major goals.”80 In addition to these five goals, close
observers of the BRI have identified additional objectives to the
benefit of China, the initiative’s initiator:
• respond to global economic crisis;81
• facilitate opening-up;82
outlook, and it is a concept that demonstrates the converse between different foreign policy
initiatives and China’s domestic development.”).
79 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I.
80 Id. pt. IV; see also WANG, supra note 8, at 168–74 (discussing these five goals).
81 See WANG, supra note 8, at 26 (discussing the BRI as “a way for global economic
growth in the post-financial crisis era”).
82 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, at pt. I (“China will stay committed to the
basic policy of opening-up, build a new pattern of all-round opening-up, and integrate itself
deeper into the world economic system.”); Wan Ziqiang & Li Shanmin, National Economic
Security and the “Belt and Road” Initiative, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 261,
267 (“The B&R is . . . an important platform to jumpstart a new round of reforms and
opening up.”); WANG, supra note 8, at 3 (“The Belt and Road construction has shaped
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provide a new source of economic growth;83
reduce excess production capacity;84
promote outbound investment;85
foster development of central and western provinces;86
improve the country’s global competitiveness;87

China’s new strategic pattern of all-round opening-up . . . .”); Yang, supra note 69, at 8
(“Internally, the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative is a new strategy that China adopts to further
promote opening up.”).
83 As Tom Miller explained:
Beijing’s great hope is that state commodity producers, engineering
firms and capital good makers will find a lucrative new market of
growth. The Belt and Road will require billions of tonnes of steel and
cement, hundreds of thousands of workers, thousands of cranes and
diggers, and dozens of new dams, power stations, and electricity grids.
MILLER, supra note 8, at 31–32.
84 See id. at 32 (“Beijing views the [BRI] as a lifeline for indebted firms suffering from
weak demand at home and looking to export their overcapacity.”); Li, China’s Pursuit, supra
note 56, at 8 (“The ultimate goal of the [BRI] is often interpreted as a way to redirect the
country’s domestic overcapacity and capital for regional infrastructure development in order
to . . . continue to keep Chinese industry and production robust, and . . . to maintain a low
unemployment rate through retaining an acceptable GDP growth rate.”); Yang, supra note
69, at 14–15 (exploring whether the BRI will help China transfer excess capacity). But see
MILLER, supra note 8, at 49–50 (questioning the potential of the BRI to “absorb China’s
industrial overcapacity”).
85 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, at pt. IV (“We . . . encourage Chinese
enterprises to participate in infrastructure construction in other countries along the Belt and
Road, and make industrial investments there.”); Mayer, supra note 18, at 10 (“China’s own
economy that is increasingly slowing down would benefit from massive infrastructure
construction projects and outward foreign direct investments, pushing forward structural
adjustment, economic reforms, industrial upgrading, and regional development within
China.”); MILLER, supra note 8, at 32 (“[The BRI] is China’s second big overseas investment
push, following the ‘Go Out’ policy launched by Jiang Zemin in 1999.”); WANG, supra note
8, at 16 (“In terms of the essence of opening-up the strategy has gradually been turned from
‘bringing in’ to ‘going global,’ and the integration of these two strategies has been
deepened.”). For discussions of the BRI in relation to outbound investment, see generally
Vivienne Bath, “One Belt, One Road” and Chinese Investment, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS,
supra note 7, at 165; Henry Ningning Huang & Terri Chenyue Tian, “One Belt, One Road”
and China’s Outbound Investment Regime, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 139.
86 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, preface (noting the need to “create strategic
propellers for hinterland development”); Mayer, supra note 18, at 12 (“The economic
conditions in Central and Western provinces are another major concern in the Chinese
capital.”); Andrew Scobell, Why the Middle East Matters to China, in CHINA’S PRESENCE IN
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 8, at 9, 18–19 (discussing the BRI as a policy to rebalance internal
economic development).
87 See Wan & Li, supra note 82, at 267 (“The B&R is a major strategic initiative for
China, as it strives to gain long-term international and comparative advantages.”); WANG,
supra note 8, at 18 (discussing how the BRI will improve China’s competitiveness by
enhancing its comparative advantage).
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internationalize renminbi, the Chinese currency;88
divert trade;89
enable strategic cooperation;90
alleviate concerns from neighbors;91
launch the “charm offensive”;92 and

88 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, at pt. IV (“We will support the efforts of
governments of the countries along the Belt and Road and their companies and financial
institutions with good credit-rating to issue Renminbi bonds in China.”); Mayer, supra note
18, at 13 (noting as a domestic driver “the internationalization of the Renminbi”); Yuan
Feng, The One Belt One Road Initiative and China’s Multilayered Multilateralism, in
MAPPING CHINA’S OBOR INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 91, 96 (considering the
“[i]nternationalization of the Chinese currency” as a goal of the BRI). See generally Chen
Weitseng, Size Matters? Renminbi Internationalization and the Beijing Consensus, in THE
BEIJING CONSENSUS? HOW CHINA HAS CHANGED WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 144 (Chen Weitseng ed., 2017) (discussing China’s efforts to internationalize
renminbi); Shen Wei, The “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, the Renminbi
Internationalisation Strategy and Neo-global Financial Governance, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS,
supra note 7, at 305 (discussing the BRI as a renminbi internationalization strategy).
89 See Li, China’s Pursuit, supra note 56, at 8 (“Externally, the goal [of the BRI] is to
continue to pave the way for the transmission of Chinese goods and services to new markets
and to improve trade and other relations with Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the European
countries.”); MILLER, supra note 8, at 31 (noting that the BRI enables China to “diversify
energy supplies”); Yuan, supra note 88, at 97 (considering as a goal of the BRI to provide a
“[g]uarantee of China’s energy supply”). See generally Gonzalo Villalta Puig, Unimpeded
Trade? The Significance of Free Trade Areas to the Belt and Road Initiative of the People’s
Republic of China, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 103, 107 (discussing the BRI in
the context of stated goal of “unimpeded trade”).
90 See WANG, supra note 8, at 57–64, 71–77 (discussing the opportunities for regional
cooperation and global development).
91 See MILLER, supra note 8, at 33 (noting that the BRI “lays out a strategic vision for
turning China into the primary global engine of economic development, rooted in the
understanding that China’s security interests are best served by tying other countries into
ever closer trade and investment relationships”). For discussions of the so-called China
threat, see generally CHINA’S FUTURE: CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER OR EMERGING THREAT (Ted
Galen Carpenter & James A. Dorn eds., 2000); BILL GERTZ, THE CHINA THREAT: HOW THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC TARGETS AMERICA (2000); STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA’S
PLAN TO DOMINATE ASIA AND THE WORLD (2000); PETER NAVARRO, THE COMING CHINA
WARS: WHERE THEY WILL BE FOUGHT AND HOW THEY CAN BE WON (2007); PETER
NAVARRO & GREG AUTRY, DEATH BY CHINA: CONFRONTING THE DRAGON—A GLOBAL CALL
TO ACTION (2015).
92 See generally JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: HOW CHINA’S SOFT POWER
IS TRANSFORMING THE WORLD (2007) (advancing the “charm offensive” thesis); see also
THOMAS LUM ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34310, CHINA’S “SOFT POWER” IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA (2008) (discussing China’s growing use of soft power in Southeast Asia).
But see Dragan Pavlićević, A Power Shift Underway in Europe? China’s Relationship with
Central and Eastern Europe Under the Belt and Road Initiative, in MAPPING CHINA’S OBOR
INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 249, 264–66 (discussing China’s lack of soft power capabilities
in Asia).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss3/1

2019]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

295

• consolidate regional leadership.93
Although we may never know for sure which of the abovementioned
objectives are the key foci of those leaders and policymakers driving
the BRI, the existence of these myriad objectives does suggest that
this initiative will develop in multiple directions in the future and will
involve many different countries and cultures at the same time.94
The third inquiry relates to the ongoing and future
participation of the BRI. As the Chinese government stated clearly
in Vision and Actions:
The Initiative is open for cooperation. It covers, but
is not limited to, the area of the ancient Silk Road. It
is open to all countries, and international and regional
organizations for engagement, so that the results of the
concerted efforts will benefit wider areas.
The Initiative is harmonious and inclusive. It
advocates tolerance among civilizations, respects the
paths and modes of development chosen by different
countries, and supports dialogues among different
civilizations on the principles of seeking common
ground while shelving differences and drawing on
each other’s strengths, so that all countries can coexist
in peace for common prosperity.95
93 See Development Finance in Asia: U.S. Economic Strategy amid China’s Belt and
Road: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 115th Cong. 22 (2017) (statement of Roy Kamphausen, Senior Vice President for
Research, The National Bureau of Asian Research) (“[The BRI] is an instrument to
consolidate China’s position at the heart of Eurasia, in a space where U.S. influence is rather
limited. The initiative is intended to counter what Beijing perceives as the U.S.’s
unacceptable containment of China off of its eastern seaboard.”); MILLER, supra note 8, at
31 (“China wants to create a network of economic dependency that will considerate its
regional leadership, enable it to hedge against the United States’ alliance structure in Asia,
and diversify energy supplies.”).
94 See WANG, supra note 8, at 43 (noting that the BRI “embodies the ‘many to many’
cooperation model among countries along the Belt and Road”).
95 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. II. Offering the Chinese perspective, Professor
Wang concurred:
The Belt and Road Initiative stresses that China will never engage in
unilateralism, nor will it impose its will on others. The initiative
welcomes countries along the routes to directly and clearly state their
development advantages and needs, and supports these countries’ efforts
to enhance their capability for independent innovation, and achieve
different cooperation through frank communication. Despite the fact that
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The document mentioned three times the “Silk Road Spirit,” which is
the shorthand for “peace and cooperation, openness and
inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit.”96 To a large
extent, the BRI provides a sharp contrast to the club-based exclusive
approach taken by the negotiators of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement97 (ACTA), the TPP, and the CPTPP.98 Compared to the
negotiations of these three instruments, the BRI’s inclusiveness is
likely to be quite similar to that of the RCEP.99 Principle 6 of the
Guiding Principles stated that “[t]he RCEP agreement will . . . have
an open accession clause to enable the participation of any ASEAN
FTA partner that did not participate in the RCEP negotiations and any
other external economic partners after the completion of the RCEP
negotiations.”100
The fourth inquiry concerns the BRI’s impact at the
multilateral and regional levels. Thus far, a key concern about the
the intuitive was proposed by China, during the construction process,
China can still choose not to take the leadership, and uphold consultation
on an equal footing so as to guarantee the rationality and feasibility of
related programs.
WANG, supra note 8, at 140–41; see also id. at 179 (“To carry the spirit of the Silk Road,
there should be respect for the development options of other cultures and countries.”); Jian
Junbo, Africa in the Maritime Silk Road: Challenges and Prospects, in RETHINKING SILK
ROAD, supra note 8, at 99, 111 (“Beijing should insist on a ‘dialogue of civilizations’ with
African countries, in lieu of a ‘clash of civilizations.’”); Yang, supra note 69, at 17 (“[T]o
jointly build the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese government abandoned the idea that the
coordination means you accept China’s plan or vice versa and stresses finding common
grounds and cooperation fields on the basis of mutual respect and then jointly make plans.”).
96 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, preface.
97 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M.
243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA]. For the Author’s discussions of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement, see generally Peter K. Yu, The ACTA Committee, in THE PLURILATERAL
ENFORCEMENT AGENDA: THE GENESIS AND AFTERMATH OF ACTA 142 (Pedro Roffe &
Xavier Seuba eds., 2014); Yu, ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, supra note 31; Peter K. Yu, ACTA
and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What
Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, What Enforcement?]; Peter K. Yu, Six
Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 (2011).
98 For discussions of this approach, see generally Daniel Gervais, Country Clubs,
Empiricism, Blogs and Innovation: The Future of International Intellectual Property Norm
Making in the Wake of ACTA, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE: WORLD TRADE
FORUM 323 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012); Yu, ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, supra
note 31.
99 See Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative—
Mapping the World’s Normative and Strategic Implications, 52 J. WORLD TRADE 163, 185
(2018) (stating that the BRI may eventually grow into “an open [legal] framework or forum,
and therefore . . . a different creature from today’s FTAs”).
100 Guiding Principles, supra note 39, Principle 6.
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initiative is its potential disruption to the existing multilateral and
regional regulatory systems,101 including those involving WIPO and
the WTO.102 Although the Chinese government’s guiding document
stated clearly that the initiative “will abide by . . . international
norms”103 and will rely on the success of the existing multilateral
101 See Huang Yunsong, China–India in the Context of One Belt One Road: Divergences
and Concerns, in CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD, supra note 8, at 27, 28 (“It is . . . quite
necessary to examine at macro-level on [the BRI’s] possible impact upon the existing world
order . . . .”); Mayer, supra note 18, at 17–21 (discussing the “[g]eoeconomic and
[i]nstitutional [r]egional [t]ransformation” brought about by the BRI); Summers, supra note
69 (exploring whether the RBI would challenge the existing global order); Wang Chuanxing,
Changing International System Structures and the Belt and Road Initiative, in RETHINKING
SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 269, 275–78 [hereinafter Wang, Changing International System
Structures] (discussing the complexities of the BRI’s impact on international system
structures).
102 See Puig, supra note 89, at 107 (“While [China] should work with Belt and Road
Initiative participant customs territories in an attempt to advance multilateral trade
negotiations through the WTO, [the country] should, nevertheless, accept that the WTO no
longer functions as an effective forum for trade liberalisation.”); Yang, supra note 69, at 25
(noting that the BRI “will not replace nor could replace the practicing international trade
rules”).
103 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. II. The Chinese government’s guiding
document further stated:
The Belt and Road Initiative is in line with the purposes and principles
of the UN Charter. It upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence: mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each
other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence.
Id. As two commentators observed:
According to most Chinese scholars’ view, in the process of converting
ideas into action, MSR [the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road] needs to
be guided, promoted, and safeguarded by international law. In turn,
some argue that to eventually build the MSR greatly depends on the
ability of China to shape, formulate, and implement cooperation based
on international law. Therefore, China should carefully study the
international law relevant to MSR in order to resolve the actual
challenges of “maritime connectivity.”
Zhang Guobin & Long Yu, Connectivity and International Law in the 21st Century Maritime
Silk Road, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 57, 58; see also Björn Ahl, China’s
New Global Presence and Its Position Towards Public International Law: Obeying, Using
or Shaping?, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 481 (discussing the compliance with
public international law and human rights treaties in the BRI context); Lee Jaemin, The Belt
and Road Initiative Under Existing Trade Agreements: Some Food for Thought on a New
Regional Integration Scheme, in INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 59
(discussing ways to implement the BRI in a manner consistent with China’s obligations
under existing international trade and investment agreements); Wang Heng, China’s
Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 29 (2019) (outlining the
approach China has taken to establish the BRI).
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regulatory system,104 the recent development of the RCEP, the New
Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
suggests that the BRI could complicate, if not undermine, those
existing multilateral and regional institutions that the United States
and Europe helped create and from which they benefit.105 The
analysis will become even more complicated when one takes into
account the statement in Vision and Actions that the BRI “is a positive
endeavor to seek new models of international cooperation and global
governance.”106 Even if the BRI does not disrupt existing multilateral
and regional institutions, it could alter or supplement them.107 The
104 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I (“The initiative to jointly build the Belt
and Road . . . is designed to uphold the global free trade regime and the open world economy
in the spirit of open regional cooperation.”); id. pt. V (“We should enhance the role of
multilateral cooperation mechanisms, make full use of existing mechanisms . . . to
strengthen communication with relevant countries, and attract more countries and regions to
participate in the Belt and Road Initiative.”); see also Shi Jingxia, The Belt and Road
Initiative and International Law: An International Public Goods Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 9, 30 (“Whatever the international legal
mechanisms chosen to safeguard BRI implementation, it should be emphasized that China
does not intend the BRI to replace the existing mechanisms and institutions of regional and
international cooperation”). One commentator observed:
[The BRI] relies on the existing multi-lateral mechanism between China
and relevant countries and borrows the existing and effective regional
cooperation platforms with the aim of holding high the banner of
peaceful development, proactively developing economic and
cooperative partnership with countries along the road reviving the
ancient silk road, cooperatively building the communities of common
interests, common destiny and common responsibilities featuring
political mutual trust, economic integration and cultural tolerance.
Yang, supra note 69, at 8.
105 See MILLER, supra note 8, at 37 (noting Washington’s fear that China “was trying to
provide an alternative to the US-dominated system of global development finance, enshrined
at Bretton Woods, which could reshape the economic architecture of Asia”); SHAMBAUGH,
supra note 10, at 162–63 (“Through [the BRI], China is meticulously constructing an
alternative and parallel global institutional architecture to the postwar western order.”); see
also Mayer, supra note 18, at 4 (“Though the new funding mechanisms and institutions
established by China fall short of challenging the principles and practices underpinning the
Bretton Woods system, China has gained more influence, especially in the Eurasian regional
financial order.”).
106 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I; see also Mayer, supra note 18, at 5 (“[T]he
ambitions of the [BRI] coupled with a ‘new model of international relations’ promoted by
Beijing are a strong signal that China is no longer a status quo power and has begun to
actively rebuild the world order.”); WANG, supra note 8, at 27–28 (discussing the BRI as a
way to “[c]reate a new model for regional cooperation in the 21st century”).
107 See MILLER, supra note 8, at 12 (noting that Beijing’s willingness to support the BRI
with new financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk
Road Fund “does not mean that China is rejecting the global architecture, . . . [b]ut it does
mean that [Beijing] wants to supplement and reshape [that architecture]”); Wang, Changing
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more disruption this initiative will cause, the more tensions and
conflicts will ensue.
The final inquiry involves the responses that the BRI will
elicit from other countries, both along and away from the Belt and
Road. To a large extent, the initiative has greatly intensified the
rivalry between China and other major powers in the Asia-Pacific
region and along the Belt and Road. Given this escalating rivalry, it
remains to be seen how these powers will respond to the growing
effort on the part of China and its neighbors to develop the BRI.108
While the Trump administration has steered the United States away
from the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia,”109 active
development along the Belt and Road will certainly raise questions
about the changing power structure within the region or the global
community.110 Viewed as a zero-sum game,111 the initiative’s
success could also undermine the efforts of other major powers in the

International System Structures, supra note 101, at 277 (discussing China’s effort “to
establish supplementary international institutions”); Yang, supra note 69, at 25 (noting that
the BRI “is only a supplement and improvement to the current international economic and
financial order”).
108 Cf. MILLER, supra note 8, at 240 (“Beijing hopes the incentive of massive
infrastructure investment will persuade Asian countries to put these economic interests
above security concerns.”).
109 See generally KURT M. CAMPBELL, THE PIVOT: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
STATECRAFT IN ASIA (2016) (discussing the Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia”).
110 A key impact of the BRI is its ability to “shift the center of geopolitical gravity away
from the U.S. and back to Eurasia.” WANG, supra note 8, at 68; see also id. at 65–70
(discussing the opportunity for Europe to change the world); Mayer, supra note 18, at 27
(“China’s great power identity and consequently its rhetoric and policies will increasingly
oscillate between a Pacific (Sino-U.S. axis) and a Eurasian (Sino-Russian axis)
orientation.”); Wolfgang Röhr, Berlin Looking Eastward: German Views of and
Expectations from the New Silk Road, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 227, 234
(“Perhaps the most exciting and difficult question for Germany is whether the ultimate prize
coveted by the Silk Road initiative is not Asia or Africa, but Europe”).
111 A good example of the zero-sum game mentality is President Obama’s declaration
at the conclusion of the TPP negotiations in Atlanta in October 2015: “When more than 95
percent of our potential customers live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China
write the rules of the global economy. We should write those rules, opening new markets to
American products while setting high standards for protecting workers and preserving our
environment.” Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, WHITE HOUSE
(Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statementpresident-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/EWQ6-WX8G].
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Asia-Pacific region,112 such as the United States,113 Japan,114 and
India.115 As with any significant initiatives within this region, the
BRI will raise serious questions about not only the initiative’s impact
on the existing regional power structure, but also the various
responses that the initiative would, or could, elicit from powers in the
region.
In sum, many questions still exist about the BRI’s ongoing
and future development. The lack of complete answers to these
questions have no doubt worried policymakers and commentators.
Yet, the evolving nature of the BRI debate has made salient the
opportunity to shape and reshape the initiative in the future. Given
the BRI’s hitherto lack of concrete policy formulation in the
intellectual property area, having this opportunity can indeed be a
blessing in disguise. With the right focus, proper understanding, and
appropriate guidance, this new initiative could be harnessed to
improve the existing international and regional intellectual property
systems.

112 See WANG, supra note 8, at 26–27 (discussing the BRI as a way to “realize global
rebalancing”); see also Li Xing & Paulo Duarte, Conclusion: The One Belt One Road in the
Politics of Fear and Hope, in MAPPING CHINA’S OBOR INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 279, 286
(“Asian powers such as India and Japan, and also the United States, are staying away from
the Chinese [One Belt, One Road] project, seeing it as a Chinese plan to ‘encircle the
world’.” (quoting an article published in the Financial Times)).
113 See MILLER, supra note 8, at 31 (“China wants to create a network of economic
dependency that will consolidate its regional leadership, enable it to hedge against the United
States’ alliance structure in Asia . . . .”).
114 See id. at 44–46 (discussing Japan’s investment and active engagement in Southeast
Asia). See generally Jiang Yang, The New Silk Road for China and Japan: Building on
Shared Legacies, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 131 (discussing the BRI as it
relates to the relationship between China and Japan).
115 “Although India stands to gain from new connectivity projects in the region, Delhi
views with considerable suspicion Chinese motivations and the long-term strategic
ramifications of expanding Chinese economic influence in the region.” Mayer, supra note
18, at 15; see also Yang, supra note 69, at 18–19 (exploring whether the BRI is “squeezing
India’s development space”). For discussions of India’s perspectives on the BRI, see
generally Darshana M. Baruah & C. Raja Mohan, Connectivity and Regional Integration:
Prospects for Sino-Indian Cooperation, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 85;
Nivedita Das Kundu, Continental Aspect of the “One Belt One Road”: India’s Perspective,
in CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD, supra note 8, at 43; M.H. Rajesh, Maritime Silk Road: An
Indian Perspective, in CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD, supra note 8, at 68; Song Haixiao, The
Belt and Road Initiative: India’s Strategy and Its Effect, in CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD
INITIATIVES, supra note 8, at 109.
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New Intellectual Property Infrastructure

Since the mid-1980s, China has been heavily criticized for its
lack of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.116
Although China’s WTO accession and the repeated overhauls of its
copyright, patent, and trademark systems have led to tremendous
improvements,117 China continues to struggle with a massive piracy
and counterfeiting problem. In March 2018, the Office of the United
States Trade Representative filed a WTO complaint against China for
its failure to comply with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights118 (TRIPS Agreement).119 That
complaint built on the Section 301 investigation120 that the Trump
administration launched in August 2017 to review Chinese laws,
policies, and practices in the areas of intellectual property,
innovation, and technology development.121 Because China and the
116

For the Author’s earlier discussions of the piracy and counterfeiting problems in
China, see generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property
in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From
Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55
AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and
the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO
OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed.
2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle].
117 The Trademark Law was adopted in August 1982 and was amended in February
1993, October 2001, and August 2013. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, amended Aug.
30, 2013, effective May 1, 2014) (China). The Patent Law was adopted in 1984 and was
amended in September 1992, August 2000, and December 2008. Patent Law of the People’s
Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12,
1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009) (China). The Copyright Law was
adopted in September 1990 and amended in October 2001 and February 2010. Copyright
Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001) (China).
118 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
119 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Measures
Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar.
23, 2018) [hereinafter Second TRIPS Complaint] (providing the complaint).
120 Section 301 permits the President to investigate and impose sanctions on countries
engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten the United States’ economic interests. See 19
U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420 (2018).
121 See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Announces
Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of China (Aug. 18, 2017), https://ustr.gov/aboutus/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiation-section
[https://perma.cc/7JF7-JFX2] (announcing the launch of the investigation); see also OFFICE
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United States failed to resolve the complaint through consultation, the
WTO established a panel in November 2018.122
Notwithstanding these troubling developments, the discourse
on intellectual property protection in China has been slowly
changing,123 especially when one closely examines the statistics
provided by international and regional organizations. Based on the
latest WIPO statistics, in 2018 China stood behind only the United
States in terms of the number of international applications124 filed
through the Patent Cooperation Treaty.125 Among corporate
applicants, Huawei Technologies, ZTE Corporation, and BOE
Technology Group—all Chinese companies—ranked among the
world’s top ten based on international patent applications.126 For the
same year, China ranked third in the number of international

OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018) (providing the final
report of the investigation); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UPDATE
CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION (2018) (providing an update to the earlier

report).
122 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China—Certain
Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc.
WT/DS542/8 (Oct. 19, 2018) (requesting the establishment of a WTO panel).
123 As I noted in an earlier article:
While piracy and counterfeiting problems continue to exist, and are
unlikely to go away any time soon, many policymakers and
commentators now see China as an innovative power, or at least an
emerging one. They also explore whether the innovation in China
complements or rivals the innovation in other parts of the world.
Peter K. Yu, When the Chinese Intellectual Property System Hits 35, 8 QUEEN MARY J.
INTELL. PROP. 3, 6–7 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, When the System Hits 35]; see also Yu, HalfCentury of Scholarship, supra note 1, at 1103–07 (discussing the growing body of
scholarship that has emerged in the mid-2000s and the early 2010s to examine China’s
changing innovative capabilities).
124 Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2018?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_pct_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KVN-5QTS] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
125 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
126 Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2018?, supra note 124.
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trademark applications127 under the Madrid Agreement Concerning
the International Registration of Marks and its related protocol.128
The WIPO figures are well corroborated by the statistics
provided by national and regional patent offices. According to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Chinese residents were
behind only those of Japan, South Korea, and Germany in 2017 in
terms of patent applications filed in the United States.129 The
European Patent Office also found that about 16 per cent of its patent
filings in that same year originated in China, which trailed behind
only the United States and Japan.130 As if these metrics were not
impressive enough, China now ranks 17th in the Global Innovation
Index, marking the country’s trajectory of progress in the innovation
area.131
Given these two diametrically opposed sets of developments,
it is timely and constructive to explore what cooperation the BRI
could facilitate in the intellectual property area. Such exploration will
be particularly important given the possibility for other countries
along the Belt and Road to initiate such cooperation. As the Chinese
government stated in Vision and Actions, the initiative “should be
jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all.”132 That
document noted further the country’s readiness to “conduct equalfooted consultation with all countries along the Belt and Road.”133
To help identify the myriad possibilities for bilateral,
regional, and international cooperation and to take advantage of the
BRI’s lack of concrete policy formulation in the intellectual property
area, this Part examines six distinct areas: (1) substantive standards;
127 Who Filed the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2018?, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_madrid_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E65G-7WLE] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
128 Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14,
1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967); Protocol Relating to the
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, June 27, 1989, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 106-41.
129 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT—FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 174–75 (2018) [hereinafter USPTO REPORT].
130 European
Patent Filings per Country of Origin, EUR. PAT. OFF.,
https://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report/2017/statistics/patentfilings.html#tab1 [https://perma.cc/3NFL-TJH4] (last visited Sept. 18, 2017).
131 GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2018: ENERGIZING THE WORLD WITH INNOVATION, at xx
(Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2018).
132 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, preface.
133 Id. pt. VIII.
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(2) procedural arrangements; (3) cross-border enforcement; (4)
dispute resolution; (5) technical cooperation; and (6) market
aggregation. Focusing on each area in turn, this Part highlights the
different constructive possibilities that the BRI can realize in the
intellectual property area. It is worth noting that these six areas are
not meant to be exhaustive; rather, they are chosen to illustrate the
BRI’s many prospects and potential contributions.
A.

Substantive Standards

As far as China and intellectual property are concerned,
considerable attention has been devoted to questions concerning the
country’s engagement with international and regional norms:134 Is
China complying with these norms? Incorporating them into its laws?
Trying to reshape existing norms? Or attempting to create new ones?
To address these questions, commentators have advanced the
quadchotomy of norm breaker, norm taker, norm shaker, and norm
maker to evaluate China’s engagement with international norms.135
In the first two decades after China’s reopening to the outside world,
this discussion of norm engagement has focused primarily on norm
breaking and norm taking.136 In recent years, however, the discussion
has slowly expanded to cover norm shaking and norm making. As I
noted in an earlier article:
Although piracy and counterfeiting remain major
problems within the country, China is not the
134 See Ahl, supra note 103 (using the trichotomy of “obeying,” “using,” and “shaping”
to analyze China’s performance in public international law, and human rights in particular);
Henry Gao, China’s Ascent in Global Trade Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker
and, Maybe Rule Maker?, in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR
DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 153 (Carolyn
Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011) (using the trichotomy of “rule taker,” “rule shaker,” and “rule
maker” to examine China’s performance in the global trade arena); Gregory Shaffer & Henry
Gao, China’s Rise: How It Took on the U.S. at the WTO, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 119
(“China successfully moved from being a ‘rule taker’ to a ‘rule shaker’ to a ‘rule maker.’”);
Yu, Rise of China, supra note 11 (examining China’s rise in the international intellectual
property regime, with a focus on the country’s engagement with international intellectual
property norms); Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 13, at 223–58 (identifying three distinct
phases in which China engages with international intellectual property norms following its
WTO accession).
135 See Yu, Rise of China, supra note 11, at 426–29 (advancing this quadchotomy).
136 See Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 13, at 212–37 (discussing the “norm breaker”
and “norm taker” phases).
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traditional norm breaker one typically infers from its
disappointing record of intellectual property
protection. Instead, the country has been a norm taker
for most of its participation in the international
intellectual property regime.
As its strength,
experience, and self-confidence grow, it slowly
assumes the additional roles of a norm shaker and a
norm maker.137
While it remains difficult to clearly distinguish between norm
shaking and norm making,138 the increased development in both
directions has suggested China’s rapidly changing position. Given
the many international norms involved in the BRI, the country’s new
position on norm engagement will no doubt color the development of
this initiative.
Admittedly, there is an irresistible urge to explore whether the
BRI would lead to more legal transplants139—a narrative that is
familiar to those studying the historical evolution of the Chinese
137

Id. at 258–59.
See id. at 250–51 (“[N]orm shaking and norm making represent two sides of the same
coin. A norm that has been shaken up and transformed will necessarily result in the making
of a new norm.”).
139 The expectation of such transplants is understandable. As Lutz-Christian Wolff
explained:
China is the B&R initiator and arguably the most economically and
politically powerful of the B&R states. One therefore has to assume that
China will, to a certain extent, dominate relationships with and between
the B&R states. This could also mean that Chinese law and Chinese legal
culture will be “exported” to other B&R states, e.g., as a result of joint
legislative initiatives, because Chinese law functions as a role model for
other B&R states, or simply because economic co-operations between
parties from B&R states will be based on contractual arrangements that
adopt Chinese law as the governing law.
Lutz-Christian Wolff, The Flexibility of Chinese Law—Trick or Treat for the “Belt and
Road” Initiative?, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 593, 594. For discussions of legal
transplant, see generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993); Peter K. Yu, The Transplant and Transformation of
Intellectual Property Laws in China [hereinafter Yu, Transplant and Transformation], in
GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 20 (Nari Lee et al.
eds., 2016) [hereinafter CHINA AND EUROPE]; Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in
International Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994);
Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974);
Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP.
J. 175 (2014); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong,
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693 (2010).
138
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intellectual property system.140 Nevertheless, there is no indication
of such transplant efforts yet. A case in point is the negotiations for
the RCEP intellectual property chapter. Despite being a dominant
player, China has thus far kept a rather low profile in those
negotiations.141 As revealed by Knowledge Ecology International,
China did not advance any draft text for the chapter. Instead, the four
draft texts came from ASEAN, India, Japan, and South Korea.142 The
only area in which China has taken a more assertive position concerns
the disclosure in patent applications of the origin or source of genetic
resources used in inventions.143 That disclosure requirement
resembles, however, Article 26 of the Chinese Patent Law, which
requires patent applicants to disclose the traditional knowledge and
genetic resources used in their inventions.144 The requirement is also
consistent with the TRIPS Article 29bis proposal that China has
cosponsored with other developing country members of the WTO.145

140 See generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 30–55 (1995) (discussing foreign
transplants in the intellectual property area and how the Chinese “learned the law at
gunpoint”); Niklas Bruun & Zhang Liguo, Legal Transplant of Intellectual Property Rights
in China: Norm Taker or Norm Maker?, in CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 139, at 43
(discussing the interaction between the transplant of intellectual property laws and the
building of intellectual property norms as a dynamic process); Li Mingde, Intellectual
Property Law Revision in China: Transplantation and Transformation, in CHINA AND
EUROPE, supra note 139, at 65 (discussing the transplant of international intellectual property
norms to China and the effort the country has made to assimilate those norms into its special
political, economic, and social structures); Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note
139 (providing a history of the transplant of intellectual property laws in China and
discussing the strengths, weaknesses, and future of such efforts).
141 See Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 13, at 229–37 (exploring why China has
assumed a low profile in the international intellectual property arena).
142 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 683–84 (noting the various
draft texts and providing sources for these texts).
143 See id. at 716–17 (discussing China’s proposal).
144 See Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1,
2009), art. 26 (China) (“With regard to an invention-creation accomplished by relying on
genetic resources, the applicant shall, in the patent application documents, indicate the direct
and original source of the genetic resources. If the applicant cannot indicate the original
source, he shall state the reasons.”).
145 See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru,
Thailand, and Tanzania, Doha Work Programme—The Outstanding Implementation Issue
on the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006) (proposing an amendment to
create a new obligation to disclose in patent applications the origin of the biological
resources and traditional knowledge used in inventions).
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If the RCEP negotiations can provide any guidance on
China’s position in international and regional norm setting, the BRI
will unlikely be the conduit for exporting Chinese intellectual
property standards along the Belt and Road. Instead, any effort to
transplant these standards and related practices will likely take a more
indirect route—for example, by requiring foreign companies entering
the Chinese market to embrace local standards and practices. This
indirect route can be highly effective because many countries along
the Belt and Road could ill afford to lose this lucrative market.146
B.

Procedural Arrangements

Compared with substantive standards, China is more likely to
export its procedural arrangements. In the past decade, the State
Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO), now the National
Intellectual Property Administration of China (CNIPA), has worked
closely with other intellectual property offices to streamline and
harmonize the patent examination systems.147 Since 2007, SIPO has
joined the European Patent Office, the Japan Patent Office, the
Korean Intellectual Property Office, and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office in the so-called “IP5” discussions.148 These
discussions have not only streamlined the patent examination process
involving applications from the five participating countries, but have
also consolidated SIPO’s status as “a player in the top tier of patent
offices that will dominate the emerging system of global patent
administration.”149
146 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 727 (“For [many poor and
weak developing countries], it is just not a viable option to lose the new trade and traderelated benefits provided by Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and
other more powerful neighbors through the RCEP.”); see also MILLER, supra note 8, at 18
(“The challenge for countries on China’s periphery is how to extract as much economic
benefit from China, in terms of trade and investment, without losing political and economic
sovereignty.”).
147 For discussions of SIPO and its related developments, see generally PETER DRAHOS,
THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS 221–36
(2010); Cheng Wenting & Peter Drahos, How China Built the World’s Biggest Patent
Office—The Pressure Driving Mechanism, 49 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
5 (2018).
148 Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 13, at 243; see also About IP5 Co-operation,
https://www.fiveipoffices.org/about.html [https://perma.cc/W68G-SAFM] (last visited Oct.
28, 2018) (providing an overview of IP5 cooperation).
149 DRAHOS, supra note 147, at 233.
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For many countries along the Belt and Road, the recent
developments in China have been highly impressive and have thereby
enhanced the appeal of Chinese institutions, policies, and practices.150
In 2017, SIPO received nearly 3.7 million patent applications, with
over 3.5 million originating from domestic applicants.151 The office
also issued 420,144 invention patents152—a figure compared
favorably with that of the United States.153 By 2012, China has
already surpassed the target of two million patent applications per
year SIPO laid down in its National Patent Development Strategy
(2011–2020).154
In view of these numbers, it is not difficult to understand why
intellectual property offices and industries along the Belt and Road
150 See STEFAN A. HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN
MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 31 (2010) (noting “a growing number
of developing nations that are loosely connected by an admiration for China”); MARK
LEONARD, WHAT DOES CHINA THINK? 122 (2008) (“[G]overnment research teams from Iran
to Egypt, Angola to Zambia, Kazakhstan to Russia, India to Vietnam and Brazil to Venezuela
have been crawling around the Chinese cities and countryside in search of lessons from
Beijing’s experience.”); Stephen Marks, Introduction to AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA
IN AFRICA 1, 11 (Firoze Manji & Stephen Marks eds., 2007) (citing Nigerians’ appreciation
of the Chinese model for providing stability and visionary leadership).
151 See Table 1 Statistics on Applications for Inventions from Home and Abroad, NAT’L
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ADMIN. CHINA,
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/statistics/2017s/201712/1111449.htm [https://perma.cc/JCP7RG28] (last visited May 9, 2018) (stating that in 2017 SIPO received a total of 1,381,594
applications for invention patents, out of which 1,245,709 belonged to domestic applicants);
Table 2 Statistics on Applications for Utility Model and Design from Home and Abroad,
NAT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ADMIN. CHINA,
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/statistics/2017s/201712/1111448.htm [https://perma.cc/J4RQF2XR] (last visited May 9,2018) (stating that in 2017 SIPO received a total of 1,687,593
applications for utility model patents and 628,658 applications for design patents, out of
which 1,679,807 and 610,817, respectively, originate from domestic applicants).
152 See Table 4 Distribution of Grants for Inventions Received from Home and Abroad,
NAT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ADMIN. CHINA,
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/statistics/2017s/201712/1111446.htm [https://perma.cc/DK5X8RXA] (last visited May 9, 2018) (stating that in 2017 SIPO granted a total of 420,144
invention patents, out of which 326,970 belonged to domestic applicants).
153 See USPTO REPORT, supra note 129, at 168 (stating that the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office issued 347,243 patents in 2017).
154 STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
(2011–2020) pt. III (2011) (China), translated at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HDQ3-W2XJ] [hereinafter NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY];
see also Steve Lohr, When Innovation, Too, Is Made in China, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02unboxed.html [https://perma.cc/XA6K2P9H] (stating that David Kappos, the director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
described SIPO’s 2015 targets as “mind-blowing numbers”).
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have been eager to work closely with their counterparts in China.
Considering the critical importance of the Chinese market to rights
holders in countries along the Belt and Road, a streamlined process
for applying for patents, trademarks, designs, and other forms of
intellectual property rights can be highly beneficial.155 Indeed, there
is a strong possibility that China will consider extending streamlined
arrangements similar to those under the IP5 to intellectual property
offices along the Belt and Road. As Lee Jyh-an observed, “[b]y
expanding [the IP5] experiences to collaboration with IP authorities
in [Belt and Road] countries, China will not only share its expertise
in IP administration, such as patent examination, but also help
domestic industries to seek better IP protection in those foreign
countries.”156 In addition, greater collaboration between the CNIPA
and intellectual property offices along the Belt and Road will further
strengthen the global profile of Chinese intellectual property offices.
One interesting question relating to both substantive standards
and procedural arrangements concerns whether China will eventually
establish a regional system that offers unitary protection, similar to
what the European Union currently offers in the form of a European
Union trade mark157 or a European Union design.158 This question
not only reflects the constant urge of intellectual property rights
holders to have a more efficient intellectual property system, but also

155

As a report on China Daily recently observed:
Since September 2017, China’s granted patent is regarded as effective
in Cambodia. In addition, starting from April in 2018, Laos has
acknowledged the results of the patent examination in China. This
progress has enabled Chinese applicants to obtain patents and IP
protection in those countries more efficiently. Cumbersome and
repetitious review procedures no longer exist.
Li, Intellectual Property in Focus, supra note 61.
156 Lee, supra note 7, at 423; see also NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY,
supra note 154, pt. IV, § 5 (“Participate in international cooperation in examination business
in a pragmatic manner and promote examination capacity building. Strengthen capacity
building for patent examination.”).
157 See Regulation 2017/1001, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June
2017 on the European Union Trade Mark art. 1(2), 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1 (“An EU trade mark
shall have a unitary character. It shall have equal effect throughout the Union . . . .”).
158 See Council Regulation 2002/6, of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs art.
1(3), as amended by Council Regulation 2006/1891, 2006 O.J. (L 386) 14 (“A Community
design shall have a unitary character. It shall have equal effect throughout the Community.”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

310

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 14

the persistent, albeit unfulfilled, hope for finally establishing a world
patent or trademark system.159
Despite these aspirations, the Asia-Pacific region has not seen
much success in creating arrangements comparable to what the
European Union now offers. Although ASEAN members have
worked closely with each other in the intellectual property area,160 it
has not yet offered any unified intellectual property rights in the tenmember association.161 Thus, if any arrangements are to be offered
through the BRI, such arrangements are likely to be closer to the
European Patent Convention162 than the European Union Trade Mark
system.163

159 But see John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME 617, 617 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (“There
is a strong drive toward a world patent system, but such a system may pose special problems
for the developing world.”); Friedrich-Karl Beier, One Hundred Years of International
Cooperation—The Role of the Paris Convention in the Past, Present and Future, 15 INT’L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1, 8 (1984) (“In view of the large variety of national laws
and interests, . . . [the] idealistic concept of an international uniform law [under the Paris
Convention] proved too utopian. And in fact, the idea of a ‘world patent’ or ‘world
trademark,’ which was subsequently revived still remains a castle in the sky.”); Sam
Ricketson, The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 9, 19 (1986)
(discussing the political difficulty in creating uniform protection in the Berne Convention).
160 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the Member States
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Government of the People’s Republic
of China on Cooperation in the Field of Intellectual Property, ASEAN-China, Dec. 21, 2009,
https://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/15thsummit/MoU-China-IP-Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6DD-BFJ4] (providing a memorandum of understanding to foster
cooperation in the intellectual property area).
161 See ALEXANDER DEGELSEGGER ET AL., ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS FOR
INNOVATION 13 (2016) (“The IP institutions, such as national IP offices, are likely to invest
more in regional cooperation to ease IP development and protection, with a unified IP (e.g.
patent) for the region in question as the ultimate possible objective, but with more
harmonisation and easier procedures as the likely second bests.”); see also Yu, ASEAN–
China Strategic Partnership, supra note 21 (discussing the cooperative efforts between
ASEAN and China in the intellectual property area).
162 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, as amended by Decision
of the Administration Council of the European Patent Organization of Dec. 21, 1978, 13
I.L.M. 268 (1974).
163 See Röhr, supra note 110, at 234 (“No one in Berlin’s foreign policy establishment
believes . . . that the Silk Road initiative could eventually become something even remotely
akin to the [European Union].”).
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Cross-Border Enforcement

Cross-border enforcement is of great significance to Asia and
the developing world.164 Such enforcement, by extension, will have
a considerable impact on the BRI. Given China’s continued struggle
with a massive piracy and counterfeiting problem—and the fact that
this problem is unlikely to go away in the near future165—it is
doubtful that China will take any aggressive position on intellectual
property enforcement in its dealing with countries along the Belt and
Road, similar to what developed countries did during the ACTA
negotiations.166 Indeed, the lack of strong intellectual property
enforcement standards in the RCEP intellectual property chapter
provides a highly revealing contrast.167
Nevertheless, with the rapidly expanding volumes of
intellectual property Chinese firms and nationals now own, the
country has slowly moved into a position where it can benefit from
stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights, even if such
benefits still do not compare favorably with those enjoyed by the
European Union or the United States.168 China will therefore have a

164 See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 329, 379 (2012) (“Enforcement will remain a key issue for many Asian countries in at
least the next decade.”).
165 See Yu, When the System Hits 35, supra note 123, at 6 (noting that “piracy and
counterfeiting problems . . . are unlikely to go away any time soon”).
166 For the Author’s discussions of intellectual property enforcement, see generally Peter
K. Yu, Digital Copyright Enforcement Measures and Their Human Rights Threats, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 455 (Christophe
Geiger ed., 2015); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement: A Neglected Child in the Intellectual Property
Family, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 279 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2016); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual
Property Enforcement and Global Climate Change, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 107 (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed., 2016); Peter K.
Yu, Why Are the TRIPS Enforcement Provisions Ineffective?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 770 (Paul Torremans ed., 2014);
Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1 (2010); Yu, What
Enforcement?, supra note 97.
167 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 714–16 (discussing the
enforcement provisions in the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter).
168 See Charges for the Use of Intellectual Property, Payments (BoP, Current US$),
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.GSR.ROYL.CD
[https://perma.cc/VQQ7-MDAT] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) (stating that the charges are
$28.66 billion and $48.35 billion for China and the United States, respectively, and that the
charges for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom combined are already $40.15 billion).
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strong interest in helping other countries along the Belt and Road to
strengthen intellectual property enforcement.
Given China’s continued reluctance to demand stronger
intellectual property enforcement standards at the international and
regional levels, the country will likely focus on improving intellectual
property enforcement through international and regional cooperation
and greater information sharing between intellectual property
enforcement authorities. As the Chinese government stated in Vision
and Actions, “[c]ountries along the Belt and Road should enhance
customs cooperation such as information exchange, mutual
recognition of regulations, and mutual assistance in law
enforcement.”169 To some extent, the approach outlined in this
guiding document is similar to the one stated in Section 10 of the draft
RCEP intellectual property chapter, which is devoted to cooperation
and consultation.170 ACTA also contains some strong language
regarding the use of shared information to improve enforcement,171
even though China may understandably remain reluctant to embrace
such language.
As far as cross-border enforcement is concerned, greater
cooperation and information sharing can be highly effective.172 After
all, piracy and counterfeiting activities can be stopped at the border
of either the in-bound or out-bound country. Notwithstanding these
dual possibilities, the comprehensive enforcement provisions in the
TRIPS Agreement do not focus on exports.173 As the WTO panel
169 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. IV; see also STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY ¶ 48
(2008), http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm
[https://perma.cc/ALN6-UZ2P] [hereinafter NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STRATEGY] (“International cooperation in customs law enforcement needs to be fully utilized
in order to effectively crack down on cross-border illegal acts and crimes involving
intellectual property.”).
170 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Intellectual Property Chapter § 10
(Oct. 15 draft),
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/RCEP-IP-Chapter-150ctober2015.docx
[https://perma.cc/TKQ3-MDVL].
171 See ACTA, supra note 97, art. 34(a) (stipulating that “each Party shall endeavour to
exchange with other Parties . . . information the Party collects under the provisions of
Chapter III (Enforcement Practices), including statistical data and information on best
practices”).
172 See Lee, supra note 7, at 423 (“[T]he Chinese customs authority must cooperate with
its counterparts along the [BRI] and enforce border measures.”).
173 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 118, arts. 41–61 (stipulating provisions covering
the enforcement of intellectual property rights); see also Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’
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made clear in China—Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Article 59 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which covers remedies in the intellectual property
enforcement section, “is not applicable to the Customs measures
insofar as those measures apply to goods destined for exportation.”174
It is therefore no surprise that ACTA sought to change the TRIPS
position by extending the enforcement provisions to both imports and
exports. Covering border measures, Article 16 of that agreement
states expressly that “[e]ach Party shall adopt or maintain procedures
with respect to import and export shipments.”175
D.

Dispute Resolution

Although legal commentators rarely consider Asian countries
litigious,176 and industries and governments have frequently
criticized the region for offering inadequate protection of intellectual
property rights,177 China has now emerged as the world’s most
litigious country in the intellectual property area.178 As the Supreme
Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 481–82 (2011) (“With twenty-one provisions on obligations
that range from border measures to criminal sanctions, the TRIPS Agreement, for the first
time, provides comprehensive international minimum standards on the enforcement of
intellectual property rights.”).
174 Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 7.231, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009).
175 ACTA, supra note 97, art. 16.1.
176 See, e.g., William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51,
67 (1987) (“[T]he United States is a more litigious society than Japan, which places a high
premium on consensus.”).
177 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 9 (2018)
(placing China, India, and Indonesia on the Priority Watch List and Pakistan, Thailand, and
Vietnam on the Watch List); Letter from Kevin M. Rosenbaum, Int’l Intellectual Prop.
Alliance, to Daniel Lee, Acting Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Innovation and
Intellectual Prop., Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Feb. 7, 2019) (recommending
that China, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam be placed on the Priority Watch List and Indonesia
and Thailand be placed on the Watch List).
178 See Peter K. Yu, Foreword to PATENTS AND INNOVATION IN MAINLAND CHINA AND
HONG KONG: TWO SYSTEMS IN ONE COUNTRY COMPARED xiv, xvi (Li Yahong ed., 2017)
(“With over 12,000 patent lawsuits in 2016, as reported by the Supreme People’s Court,
China is now one of the world’s preferred venues for patent litigation.”); J. Benjamin Bai &
Da Guoping, Strategies for Trade Secrets Protection in China, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 351, 351 (2011) (“China became the world’s most litigious country for intellectual
property disputes in 2005, surpassing the U.S. in the number of intellectual property lawsuits
filed annually.”); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: Revealing the New
China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS L.J. 773, 775 (2011) (comparing the
patent, copyright, and trademark cases filed in the United States in 2005 and 2006 with those
filed in China); Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34
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People’s Court of China stated in its 2018 report, over 16,000 new
patent cases were filed in 2017, featuring an increase of close to 30
percent.179 That same report also showed the filing of close to 38,000
new trademark cases and over 137,000 new copyright cases, with
increases of close to 40 and 60 percent, respectively.180
In view of China’s growing litigiousness in the intellectual
property area, it is not difficult to understand why the resolution of
private disputes has recently received considerable attention among
Chinese policymakers and commentators.181 Indeed, legal risks have
been highlighted as one of the BRI’s potential challenges. As Wang
Yiwei observed:
[T]he Belt and Road Initiative involves more than 60
countries with the legal systems being different [from]
that of China. This will give rise to the risk of
asymmetric legal information. According to legal
systems, countries involved in the initiative mainly
CAMPBELL L. REV. 525, 544–49 (2012) (discussing the potential intellectual property
litigation explosion in China).
179 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE STATUS OF
JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINESE COURTS (2017) 3
(2018),
https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/2017e799bde79aaee4b9a62018041.docx [https://perma.cc/X8LN-E5UM] (reporting the number of new patent cases at
16,010).
180 Id. (reporting the number of new trademark and copyright cases at 37,946 and
137,267, respectively).
181 Countries have generally attempted to resolve public disputes under two different
routes. The first is the state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism, such as the one under the
WTO. See Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (providing the rules for the WTO dispute
settlement process). The second route is the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism,
such as the one provided in the investment chapter in bilateral, regional, or plurilateral trade
agreements. See Bath, supra note 85, at 182–87 (discussing investor-state dispute settlement
in the BRI context). For the Author’s discussions of investor-state dispute settlement, see
generally Peter K. Yu, Conceptual and Institutional Improvements in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INVESTMENT LAW
(Christophe Geiger ed., forthcoming 2019); Peter K. Yu, Investor-State Dispute Settlement
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 463
(Christophe Geiger et al. eds., 2018); Peter K. Yu, The Pathways of Multinational
Intellectual Property Dispute Settlement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PROPERTY: OF
PHARMACEUTICALS, TOBACCO, COMMODITIES AND OTHER MATTERS (Christopher Heath &
Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., forthcoming 2019); Peter K. Yu, Crossfertilizing ISDS
with TRIPS, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321 (2017); Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 829 (2017).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss3/1

2019]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

315

fall into two categories: countries adopting the
continental legal system and those following the
Anglo-American legal system. Apart from that, some
belong to the Islamic legal system. . . . [By contrast,]
China has adopted a unique socialist legal system.
Despite its closeness to the continental legal system,
when it comes to specific legal regulations, China’s
system is still different from those of other
countries.182
More importantly, “[t]he difference in legal systems can result in
different outcomes when legal disputes occur, in which case the
applicability of laws is weakened, and a series of legal risks can
emerge.”183 Some countries along the Belt and Road may also lack
sophisticated legislation or effective enforcement mechanisms,184 not
to mention that the legal systems in these countries can be severely
underdeveloped.185
Fortunately, the BRI will benefit from discussions that have
already started in the BRICS context. In October 2015, the Shanghai
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission launched
a pioneering center to resolve private disputes involving the BRICS
countries.186 “Created with the support of the China Law Society and
other members of the BRICS legal community,” the BRICS Dispute
Resolution Centre Shanghai aims to “provide[] alternative dispute
resolution services for commercial disputes between parties from the
BRICS countries.”187 Two months before the Eighth BRICS Summit
in Goa, India in October 2016, members of the BRICS community
also

182

WANG, supra note 8, at 113.
Id.
184 As Professor Wang continued, “[T]he legislation of some countries is not
sophisticated enough with frequent amendments. In terms of law enforcement, these
countries discriminate against foreign or foreign-funded enterprises, sometimes even issuing
targeted legal regulations . . . on certain transnational companies to benefit their domestic,
political and economic situations.” Id. at 113–14.
185 See id. at 119 (“The Belt and Road Initiative involves a great many countries, some
of which have the problem of inefficient legal structures. In their overseas business, there is
a great possibility that Chinese enterprises will find no laws to follow.”).
186 Fernando Dias Simões, A Dispute Resolution Centre for the BRICS?, in BRICSLAWYERS’ GUIDE, supra note 1, at 287, 296.
187 Id.
183
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identified . . . the need to set up a neutral institution
for the resolution of intra-BRICS commercial and
investment disputes; to develop the expertise and
skills of legal professionals in international arbitration
among BRICS nations to support and ensure the
success of the BRICS international arbitral
mechanism; to ensure adequate representation of
arbitrators from emerging economies to avoid
structural bias and partiality or the perception thereof
by arbitrators originating from the developed world;
and to reform the existing investor state arbitration
mechanism under the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes . . . and under
bilateral investment treaties to account for the unique
circumstances and challenges of emerging
economies.188
Outside the BRICS context, some “commentators have urged the
Chinese government to build a joint IP dispute resolution
mechanism.”189 A similar mechanism can be established in the BRI
context.
E.

Technical Cooperation

Technical cooperation is seemingly benign, yet it has serious
ramifications for the development of the intellectual property
system.190 Indeed, commentators have repeatedly questioned
188

Id.
Lee, supra note 7, at 423. See generally Chai Yuhong, Regional Dispute Resolution:
An International Civil Dispute Resolution Model for East Asia, in INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 261 (calling for the development of an international civil
dispute resolution model for East Asia).
190 Technical cooperation is included as an obligation under Article 67 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which provides as follows:
In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed
country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed
terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of
developing and least-developed country Members. Such cooperation
shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on
the prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the
establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies
relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel.
189
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whether governments in developed countries and international and
regional organizations have provided technical assistance in the right
direction.191 Given the controversy in this area, one would logically
question whether the assistance China provides through the BRI will
ultimately benefit developing countries along the Belt and Road.
This question is particularly timely considering that rapidly
expanding volumes of intellectual property Chinese firms and
nationals now own and the growing ability of the Chinese intellectual
property offices and industry groups to provide technical
assistance.192
Notwithstanding this understandable concern, a country’s
position on technical cooperation tends to be colored by its intention
to export intellectual property standards.193 Considering that China

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 118, art. 67.
191 See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 180–
86 (2009) (discussing the use of technical assistance and capacity-building programs to
advance agendas in TRIPS-related policy debates); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPSRound II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 25 (2004) (“[T]he countries in
a position to provide assistance do so on their own terms; that is, they help implement highly
protectionist regimes, without regard for the actual needs of developing nations.”); Peter K.
Yu, The Strategic and Discursive Contributions of the Max Planck Principles for Intellectual
Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 62 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE
20, 30 (2014) (“[T]echnical assistance should not be provided based on the interests of donor
countries or the privileged members of an international intergovernmental organization—be
it WIPO or the WTO.”); Yu, Thinking About the TPP, supra note 32, at 109
(“Oftentimes, . . . ‘best practices’ are introduced [by technical assistance experts] without
regard to a particular country’s local needs, interests, conditions, or priorities.”); see also
Christopher May, Capacity Building and the (Re)production of Intellectual Property Rights,
25 THIRD WORLD Q. 821, 822 (2004) (“[C]apacity building for [intellectual property
rights] . . . may . . . lead to effective ‘epistemic lock-in’: capacity building programmes
socialise policy makers, practitioners and others into a specific way of dealing with, and
regulating, [intellectual property rights]. It encourages the development of a TRIPs mindset.”).
192 See NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, supra note 154, pt. IV, ¶ 12
(“Increase assistance to developing countries in the capacity building on intellectual property
and strengthen coordination with developing countries on China’s positions and promote
common development in patent area.”).
193 See DEERE, supra note 191, at 180–86 (discussing the use of technical assistance and
capacity-building programs to advance agendas in TRIPS-related policy debates); Duncan
Matthews & Viviana Muñoz-Tellez, Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: The United
States, Japan and the European Communities in Comparative Perspective, 9 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 629, 632 (2006) (discussing the technical assistance provided by the United
States, Japan, and the European Union in accordance with Article 67 of the TRIPS
Agreement).
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has thus far remained reluctant to export these standards,194 one has
to wonder how eager China is to use technical cooperation to covertly
achieve what it has so far declined to do. It is worth recalling that the
BRI has been created in part to build trust in countries along the Belt
and Road and to promote harmony between them.195 The meager
benefits of exporting intellectual property standards technical
cooperation would unlikely compensate for the harm resulting from
the distrust such covert action would breed in countries along the Belt
and Road.
If the BRI is to facilitate technical cooperation, such
cooperation will likely resemble those aid and cooperation efforts
China is now undertaking in Africa, South America, and Southeast
Asia.196 Although these efforts have inevitably raised neocolonial
concerns,197 they also include generous “early harvest programs” that
194

See discussion supra Section III.A.
See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. II (emphasizing that the BRI is
“harmonious and inclusive”); id. (“The Initiative seeks mutual benefit. It accommodates the
interests and concerns of all parties involved, and seeks a conjunction of interests and the
‘biggest common denominator’ for cooperation so as to give full play to the wisdom and
creativity, strengths and potentials of all parties.”); id. pt. III (“The Belt and Road Initiative
is a way for win-win cooperation that promotes common development and prosperity and a
road towards peace and friendship by enhancing mutual understanding and trust . . . .”); see
also Zhang Jie, Security Environment Around China: Changes, Construction, and
Challenges, in CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVES, supra note 8, at 13, 33 (“China is
supposed to strengthen mutual trust in politics and security to create a favorable environment
for regional economic collaboration, while insisting on maintaining the bottom line of the
integrity of national sovereignty.”).
196 See Wang Yiwei, The Belt and Road—Hot Inside and Cold Outside? A Position
Essay, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 95, 98–99 (discussing why the BRI cannot be
equated with foreign aid). See generally Deborah Brautigam, China’s Foreign Aid in Africa:
What Do We Know, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 197 (Robert I.
Rotberg ed., 2008) (discussing China’s foreign aid in Africa); DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE
DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2010) (providing a comprehensive
account of China’s aid and economic cooperation in Africa). For discussions of China’s
engagement with Africa, see generally AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA (Firoze
Manji & Stephen Marks eds., 2007); CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 14;
CHINA INTO AFRICA, supra; CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT
EMBRACE (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008); CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH: A
SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE (Dorothy-Grace Guerrero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008)
[hereinafter CHINA’S NEW ROLE]; THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES,
OPPORTUNITIES AND CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS (Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi eds. 2010)
[hereinafter RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA]; IAN TAYLOR, CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN
AFRICA (2009).
197 As two commentators observed:
There is a growing concern in Africa that the increasing engagement of
the Asian giants, in their search for energy and minerals, could, if not
195
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enable qualified trading partners to obtain early access to select
sectors of the Chinese market.198 To a large extent, these early
harvest programs fit well with what Joshua Kurlantzick has described
as China’s “charm offensive,” one of BRI’s potential goals.199
One question that will likely arise in this area concerns
technology transfer. The TRIPS Agreement has built such transfer
into Article 66, which requires developed countries to provide
incentives for their businesses and institutions to promote and
encourage technology transfer to least developed countries.200
Although China is still a developing country and does not bear any
technology transfer obligation under Article 66, China’s “emerging
power” status has likely generated expectation that the country will
at least transfer some technology to its poor neighbors along the Belt
and Road.
In Vision and Actions, the Chinese government affirmed its
“commit[ment] to shouldering more responsibilities and obligations
within its capabilities, and making greater contributions to the peace
and development of mankind.”201 Emphasizing the goal of building
“people-to-people bonds,” that document also stated that China and
countries along the Belt and Road “should increase . . . cooperation
managed properly, turn out to be just as bad as the “scramble for
resources” that led to the colonization of the continent during the second
half of the nineteenth century.
Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi, Introduction—Africa in the Twenty-First Century: Strategic and
Development Challenges, in RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA, supra note 196, at 1, 6; see
also R. EVAN ELLIS, CHINA IN LATIN AMERICA: THE WHATS AND WHEREFORES 1 (2009)
(noting “concern about the long-term geopolitical ambitions of [China] and worry about
exchanging one form of dependency for another”); Dot Keet, The Role and Impact of
Chinese Economic Operations in Africa, in CHINA’S NEW ROLE, supra note 196, 78, 81
(questioning “whether the rapidly growing role of China . . . is one of partnership and
cooperation, or more akin to colonial or neocolonial patterns, or reflective of a new
imperialism”); MILLER, supra note 8, at 80 (“As China bankrolls development across Central
Asia, ordinary people fear being swallowed by their neighbor.”); TAYLOR, supra note 196,
at 2 (“Our African partners really have to watch out that they will not be facing a new process
of colonization [in their relations with China].” (quoting Karin Kortmann, Parliamentary
State Secretary, German Development Ministry)).
198 See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 5, at 996–97 (discussing these
programs).
199 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
200 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 118, art. 66(2) (“Developed country Members
shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.”).
201 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I.
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in science and technology, establish joint labs (or research centers),
international technology transfer centers and maritime cooperation
centers, promote sci-tech personnel exchanges, cooperate in tackling
key sci-tech problems, and work together to improve sci-tech
innovation capability.”202 At the High Level Conference on
Intellectual Property for Countries Along the “Belt and Road” in July
2016, State Councilor Wang Yong also noted that the BRI could
provide assistance in the area of “joint human resources training.”203
The expectation that China will share a greater burden on
technology transfer is not difficult to understand when one considers
the BRI’s considerable potential to enhance China’s position in
science and technology. As Wang Yiwei observed, “[T]he Belt and
Road is a high-tech road, in which China’s capital and technology
will be used to promote the high quality ‘Made in China’ brand in the
big markets of Europe and Asia.”204 The initiative will also greatly
improve China’s global competitiveness. As Professor Wang
continued:
China’s competitiveness will be improved in an allround manner. Based on the initiative, China will
identify new comparative advantages through alldimensional opening-up in the system of global labor
division. In the new round of global competition,
China climbs up the global industrial chain from its
low-end to high-end, and China’s comparative
advantages also upgrade from being labor-andresource-intensive
to
technology-and-capital205
intensive.
Ironically, the issue about technology transfer appeared in the
United States’ recent WTO complaint against China.206 Focusing on
202

Id. pt. IV; see also Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen & Su Ping, Knowledge-Based
Institutions in Sino-Arctic Engagement: Lessons for the Belt and Road Initiative, in
RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 147 (discussing active Sino-Arctic cooperation
through knowledge-based institutions).
203 Belt and Road Conference Release, supra note 57; see also NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 169, ¶ 65 (“Encourage international cooperation on
training of intellectual property professionals.”).
204 WANG, supra note 8, at 12.
205 Id. at 18.
206 Second TRIPS Complaint, supra note 119.
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the topic of “forced technology transfer,” the complaint alleged that
“China deprive[d] foreign intellectual property rights holders of the
ability to protect their intellectual property rights in China as well as
freely negotiate market-based terms in licensing and other
technology-related contracts.”207 Whether China wins or loses in this
dispute, the WTO panel decision will likely have some impact on the
future interpretation of the technology transfer obligations under
Articles 7 and 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.208 By extension, the
case will therefore have some consequences—both intended and
unintended—on the future of technology transfer along the Belt and
Road.
F.

Market Aggregation

The final area of potential cooperation through the BRI
concerns market aggregation, which is particularly important for
small countries along the Belt and Road. For these countries, the
opportunity to connect with other countries, especially larger ones,
will greatly enhance their ability to participate in international and
regional trade, attract foreign direct investment, or develop regulatory
solutions to cross-border problems. As I noted in relation to the
recent amendment to the TRIPS Agreement:
[The regional pooling arrangement provided by
Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS Agreement] allows less
developed countries to aggregate their markets to
generate the purchasing power needed to make the
development of an indigenous pharmaceutical
industry attractive. It also paves the way for the
development of regional supply centers, procurement

207

Id. at 1.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 118, art. 7 (“The protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute to . . . the transfer and dissemination of
technology . . . .”); id. art. 66.2 (“Developed country Members shall provide incentives to
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a
sound and viable technological base.”).
208
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systems, patent pools and institutions, while
facilitating technical cooperation within the region.209
Indeed, policy choices tend to vary according to market size.
A country that has a sufficiently large market is often in a better
position to utilize intellectual property protection to attract foreign
direct investment.210 Such a country will also be able to use threats
of compulsory licensing more effectively to induce foreign
manufacturers to lower the price of drugs and other intellectual
property-based goods and services.211 Given these multiple benefits,
it is understandable why the drafters of the recently adopted Article
31bis included language to support market aggregation and pooled
procurement.212 This provision allows “a pharmaceutical product
produced or imported under a compulsory licence . . . to be exported
to the markets of those other developing or least developed country
parties to [a qualifying] regional trade agreement that share the health
problem in question.”213

209 Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM.
J.L. & MED. 345, 346 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H.
Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and
Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 921, 973–77 (2007) (discussing the potential benefits of pooled procurement strategies
and the establishment of regional pharmaceutical supply centers); SISULE F. MUSUNGU ET
AL., UTILIZING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTHSOUTH REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS, at xv-xvi (2004) (advocating the establishment of “regional
procurement systems where they would jointly conduct tendering through an entity acting
on their behalf and a central purchasing agency managing the purchases on behalf of all the
member countries”); id. at 70–73 (discussing regional procurement systems).
210 See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 266 (2003) (“If [Keith] Maskus is
correct that strengthening intellectual property law will increase import volumes, then a
developing country with an adequate number of consumers may eventually see some direct
investment following the successful exploitation of product markets.” (footnote omitted));
Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 116, at 177 (stating as one of the condition for the intellectual
property system to attract foreign direct investment that “the country . . . ha[s] a sufficiently
large market to enable foreign firms to capture economies of scale or scope”).
211 See Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1573, 1579 (2013) (noting as one of the factors for Brazil’s success in threatening to
issue compulsory licenses in the pharmaceutical context its “lucrative middle class market
that U.S. pharmaceutical companies cannot afford to lose or alienate”).
212 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 118, art. 31bis(3).
213 Id. The qualification is that “at least half of the current membership of [that
agreement] is made up of countries presently on the United Nations list of least developed
countries.” Id.
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CONCLUSION
In fall 2013, China launched the BRI, raising a series of
questions concerning what this new initiative would mean to the
Asia-Pacific region and the outside world. Although the Chinese
government’s guiding document, Vision and Actions, has provided
some clarity to the initiative’s core objectives and geographical reach,
commentators remain divided over the BRI’s overall benefits,
potential drawbacks, and future impacts.
Many of these
commentators also encounter considerable analytical challenges
when they examine this fast-evolving and highly malleable initiative.
In view of the very limited analysis the BRI has thus far
attracted from intellectual property commentators, this Article
devotes the space provided by the present Symposium to explore the
initiative’s potential development in this area. Showing how this
initiative has not yet attracted much concrete policy formulation, the
Article underscores the opportunity to shape the BRI’s future in the
intellectual property area. Specifically, this Article identifies six
possible areas of cooperation, whose in-depth exploration could
deepen our understanding of the BRI and its potential impact on
international and regional intellectual property norm setting.
Even with all the detailed analysis provided in this Article,
some commentators will still worry about the problems and
challenges brought about by this new initiative. Finding the motives
behind the BRI highly suspicious and potentially alarming, these
commentators will question whether the initiative will enhance
China’s power at the expense of other countries along the Belt and
Road. They will also explore whether the initiative will greatly
undermine the structural integrity and continued vitality of existing
international and regional intellectual property systems. Given the
historical conflicts and border disputes in the Asia-Pacific region214
and the highly polarized nature of any debate on China policy, these
worries and fears are not difficult to understand.
Unlike the commentators in the first camp, some
commentators will be excited about the BRI’s promise and ongoing
development. For those in China, this initiative will greatly enhance
214 See Yang Danzhi, Situations in Southeast Asia and Constructing Maritime Silk Road,
in CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVES, supra note 8, at 157, 160 (noting the tensions
between China and its neighbors—most notably, the Philippines and Vietnam—in the South
China Sea).
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the country’s integration with the outside world while generating new
opportunities for outbound investment.215 The BRI will also help
rejuvenate the country, bringing benefits that are comparable to those
generated for centuries by the ancient Silk Road.216 Even for those
outside China, the drive for greater connectivity and regulatory
coordination along the Belt and Road seems to be, on balance,
desirable.217 While greater integration into the global economy will
undoubtedly enhance China’s power, such integration will also
benefit the world. Issues relating to trade, investment, and
development do not always play out as zero-sum games.
Finally, a third camp exists and holds positions that are
somewhere in between. While commentators in this camp remain
excited about the BRI’s prospects, they are equally worried about its
well-documented perils. Given the yin-yang mentality commonly
found in China-related analysis,218 and the tremendous complexity
within China,219 these commentators feel comfortable reconciling the
215 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I (stating that the BRI “will help align
and coordinate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road, tap
market potential in this region, promote investment and consumption, create demands and
job opportunities”).
216 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
217 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I (stating that the BRI is aimed at
“encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to achieve economic policy coordination
and carry out broader and more in-depth regional cooperation of higher standards”).
218 See generally Peter K. Yu, Clusters and Links in Asian Intellectual Property Law
and Policy, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN LAW 147, 148 (Christoph Antons ed., 2017)
[hereinafter Yu, Clusters and Links] (“[T]here is no easy way to discuss intellectual property
developments in Asia without also mentioning their complexities.”); Peter K. Yu,
Intellectual Property, Asian Philosophy and the Yin-Yang School, 7 WIPO J. 1 (2015)
(discussing the application of the Yin-Yang school and correlative thinking to the intellectual
property field); see also CHEN JIANFU, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 10
(2008) (noting the influence of Yin-Yang Jia on traditional Chinese conceptions of law).
219 As David Shambaugh observed:
China remains a deeply conflicted rising power with a series of
competing international identities. Many new voices and actors are now
part of an unprecedentedly complex foreign-policymaking process.
Consequently, China’s foreign policy often exhibits diverse and
contradictory emphases. Understanding these competing identities is
crucial to anticipating how Beijing’s increasingly contradictory and
multidimensional behavior will play out at the world stage. Each
orientation carries different policy implications for the United States and
other nations.
David Shambaugh, Coping with a Conflicted China, 34 WASH. Q. 7, 7 (2011); see also
Mayer, supra note 18, at 7 (“One reason China has not yet developed a clear selfunderstanding is because of the country’s ambivalent nature. It can be seen as both weak and
strong. Its character is both ‘developed’ and ‘developing.’ China is both backwards and
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seemingly diametrically opposed views of the two previous camps.220
Knowing that the BRI will provide both benefits and drawbacks,
these commentators recommend countries along the Belt and Road to
participate in the initiative with their eyes open. As one commentator
warned, “one should remember the adage ‘Be careful what you wish
for.’”221
There are strong arguments to support the views of each
camp, and this Article does not opine on whether the view of one
camp is superior to, or more supportable than, the others. Oftentimes,
the analysis will depend on one’s worldview, ideological values, and
policy preferences. Nevertheless, before we can determine which
camp best reflects our preferred position, we will need a deeper
understanding of the BRI. If this Article can help develop this crucial
understanding—in the intellectual property area, in particular—it will
have accomplished its mission.

cutting edge at the same time.”); Yu, Clusters and Links, supra note 218, at 148 (noting “the
duality—or the yin and yang—inherent in Asian societies”); Peter K. Yu, International
Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1, 25–26 (discussing China’s schizophrenic position in the international intellectual
property arena). As I noted in the intellectual property context:
China is “a country of countries.” The country is large, complex, diverse,
and “sometimes internally contradictory.” The Chinese speak different
languages, enjoy different cuisines, grow up with different cultures, and
subscribe to different historical and philosophical traditions. Conditions
in Beijing are often very different from those in Guangzhou, intellectual
property strategies that are effective in Shanghai are likely to fail in a
village in Guizhou, and the trade patterns found near the coasts are very
different from those found inland.
Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1118 (2011).
220 See Li & Duarte, supra note 112, at 282 (“Heuristically, the phenomenon of a set of
persistent ‘bifocal lenses’ of opportunity-threat in studying the impact and implication of the
rise of China . . . helps us to develop a multi-dimensional approach to understanding the
multi-facets of China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative.”).
221 Nora Fisher Onar, Former Empires, Rising Powers: Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanism and
China’s New Silk Road, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 177, 188 (emphasis
omitted).
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